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This dissertation consists of two studies to investigate the contingent effects 
of corporate political strategies on firm outcomes. To address this theoretical 
inquiry, I examine (a) firms’ political connections built through managerial 
political service and (b) public patronage in the form of public visits to firms by 
government officials, and their effects on firm performance and access to external 
resources. I theoretically propose and empirically find the important contingencies 
that impact the relationships between political strategies and firm outcomes, 
including (a) the structural relations among political actors who share authority in 
the political system and (b) political actors’ discretion over the allocation of 
resources in markets. As such, this dissertation contributes to a complete, 
comprehensive, and contingent perspective on the effects of corporate political 
strategies.  
In particular, the first study examines both the positive and negative 
performance effects of firms’ political strategies, contingent upon the structural 
relations among political actors sharing power in the government. I propose that 
while firms’ connections with the focal political actor that possesses the main 
authority over the business activity pursued by the firms enhance firm 
performance, firms’ connections with rival political actors who compete with the 
focal political actor hurt firm performance. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
negative effect varies with the competitive tension between these political actors. 
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Finally, I argue that firms can strategically neutralize the harms stemming from 
their connections with rival political actors by building connections with a 
constraining political actor who lies outside the rival dyad and has the ability to 
limit the focal political actor’s behavior. The empirical analysis employing data 
on acquisitions by Chinese steel firms during the industry’s consolidation from 
1999 to 2010 supports the theory. 
The second study proposes an indirect signaling mechanism through which 
political strategies generate value for firms. This study suggests that public 
patronage in the form of public visits to firms by government officials provides 
signals on the firms’ quality, government favor, and/or legitimacy to third-party 
resource holders, which in turn facilitate the firms’ access to external resources. 
More importantly, while prior research suggests diminished value of political 
strategies generated through direct mechanisms under less government 
intervention in markets, I argue that the signaling value of public patronage 
increases when the government has less control over the resource markets. Results 
based on a unique dataset that comprehensively covers public visits by 
government officials to Chinese steel firms during 1995–2009 confirm these 
arguments.  
In addressing the core research question regarding the contingent effects of 
political strategies on firm outcomes, this dissertation advances the literatures on 
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CHAPTER 1: BOON OR BANE? THE CONTINGENT EFFECTS OF 
POLITICAL STRATEGIES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the positive and negative performance effects of firms’ 
political strategies, contingent upon the structural relations among political actors 
within the government. Drawing upon corporate political strategy literature and 
the competitive dynamics perspective, this paper shows that, while firms benefit 
from their connections with the focal political actor that possesses the main 
authority over the business activity pursued by them, firms suffer from their 
connections with rival political actors who compete with the focal political actor. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the negative effect varies with the competitive 
tension between these political actors. To neutralize the negative effect, firms can 
strategically turn to a constraining political actor outside the rival dyad that 
possesses the ability to limit the focal political actor’s behavior. Analyses on the 










Researchers are increasing their attention to corporate political strategies and 
their performance effects (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Jia, 2014). While 
prior research discusses the benefits accrued from political strategies, empirical 
evidence has documented positive, negative, and no relationships between 
political strategies and firm performance (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). Recent 
studies suggest the effectiveness of political strategies depends on the government 
structure, such that political strategies targeted at a political actor may provide 
only limited benefits if this political actor is constrained by other political actors 
in the government (Kozhikode and Li, 2012; Macher and Mayo, 2012). Despite 
these insights into the varying degrees of positive effects of political strategies, 
prior research remains largely silent on whether and under what conditions the 
structural relations between political actors may negatively impact firms pursuing 
political strategies, and even more importantly, how these firms can cope with 
such negative effect. To answer these questions, this paper draws upon corporate 
political strategy literature (Hillman and Keim, 1995) and the competitive 
dynamics perspective (Chen and Miller, 2012; Yu and Cannella, 2007) to 
investigate both the positive and negative performance effects of political 
strategies by focusing on the structural relations between power-sharing political 
actors in the government, particularly political rivals.  
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Competitive dynamics theory analyzes the antecedents, consequences, and 
competitive contexts of rival behavior. Prior research has identified three 
underlying drivers of competitive activity: the rivals’ awareness, motivation, and 
capability (AMC) (Chen, 1996; Yu and Cannella, 2007). While competitive 
dynamics research has largely focused on inter-firm rivalry, emerging research 
has begun to extend beyond firm dyads and analyze rivalry at other levels 
(Kilduff, Elfenbein, and Staw, 2010). As such, Chen and Miller (2012) point to 
the applicability of the competitive dynamics perspective to explain relationships 
between any actors or entities other than firms. In this study, I employ 
competitive dynamics theory to examine how structural relations among political 
actors influence their awareness, motivation, and capability, which in turn affect 
their behavior toward firms pursing political strategies. I propose that while firms 
connected with the focal political actor — the political actor that possesses the 
main authority to facilitate or hinder the business activity pursued by the firms — 
reap performance gains, firms connected with rival political actors that compete 
with the focal political actor suffer performance loss. Moreover, the magnitude of 
the negative effect depends on the competitive tension between the focal and rival 
political actors, which is driven by the similarity between and the salience of the 
political rivals. Finally, to neutralize this negative effect, firms can act 
strategically to take advantage of the structural relations in the government by 
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turning to a constraining political actor that lies outside the rival dyad and has the 
ability to limit the focal political actor’s behavior. 
The empirical analysis employs data on acquisitions by Chinese steel firms 
during the industry’s consolidation from 1999 to 2010. As a regulated industry, 
the steel industry remains subject to government intervention and has been used in 
previous research on political strategies (Schuler, 1996). Moreover, a substantial 
body of research in political economy has noted the fragmented structure of the 
Chinese government, characterized by regional decentralization and inter-
jurisdictional competition (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Montinola, Qian, and 
Weingast, 1995). Therefore, China’s steel industry provides an ideal context to 
examine the interplay among firms and political actors. This study tests the effects 
of steel acquirers’ connections with local and central governments on their 
performance measured with their likelihood of acquisition during the industry’s 
consolidation.   
This paper contributes to corporate political strategy literature (Bonardi, 
Hillman, and Keim, 2005; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). First, the focus of this study 
on the structural relations between political actors gives new insight into the 
mixed empirical evidence in extant literature regarding the performance effects of 
political strategies (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). With a contingent and 
comprehensive perspective, this paper accounts for both the positive and negative 
effects of political strategies. Second, this study identifies the similarity between 
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and the salience of political rivals as drivers of different levels of competitive 
tension, thereby providing a fine-grained analysis on the varying degrees of 
negative effects experienced by politically connected firms. Finally, this paper 
suggests possible coping strategies such as turning to a constraining political actor 
to limit the focal political actor’s behavior. This discussion is consistent with 
emerging research that emphasizes the strategic implications of institutional 
constraints on political actors (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008; Kozhikode and 
Li, 2012; Macher and Mayo, 2012).  
This study also contributes to competitive dynamics research (Smith, Ferrier, 
and Ndofor, 2001). First, this paper identifies the government as an important 
stakeholder and demonstrates the applicability of competitive dynamics theory to 
examine relationships between political actors. The findings are consistent with 
emerging work that has begun to include a broader range of stakeholders in 
addition to firms when exploring competitive dynamics (Chen and Miller, 2014). 
Further, by considering politicians’ career concerns as the drivers of competitive 
tension and behavior, this study corresponds to the shift of focus in competitive 
dynamics research from organizational characteristics to individual motivation 
and perception (Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007). As such, this paper advances emerging 
research in exploring the potential of competitive dynamics theory to bridge 
macro- and micro-analyses (Chen and Miller, 2012). Finally, in line with recent 
competitive dynamics research that extends beyond market boundaries (Capron 
6 
 
and Chatain, 2008; Markman, Gianiodis, and Buchholtz, 2009), this paper links 
competitive dynamics perspective to nonmarket strategy literature.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Contingent effects of political strategies  
Government exerts substantial influence over business. Through regulations, 
government can block mergers and acquisitions, cap industrial output, and adjust 
labor and environmental costs (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999). In 
response, firms build access to government through political strategies including 
lobbying, campaign contributions, and managers’ political service to shape policy 
making and access information and resources (Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 
2002). In emerging economies, firms use political strategies to overcome weak 
legal and economic institutions. Political connections provide firms with access to 
economic resources and protection from government expropriation (Li and Zhang, 
2007; Peng and Luo, 2000).  
A growing body of research suggests that the benefits arising from firms’ 
political strategies depend on the government structure. In many political systems, 
power is shared among various political actors with divergent or even conflicting 
interests (Ring et al., 2005). Therefore, the discretion of a political actor over 
policy making and resource allocation is constrained by its relations with other 
political actors. For instance, the executive branch often has less discretion under 
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presidential systems than parliamentary systems (Hillman and Keim, 1995). 
Within a government, appointed regulators are constrained by the executive and 
legislative branches, and their ruling decisions reflect compromise among these 
different government branches (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008). As such, the 
effectiveness of a firm’s political strategies should depend on the discretion of the 
political actor that the firm targets, in that a constrained political actor may lack 
the authority to aid the firm (Macher and Mayo, 2012).  
Following these arguments, a firm is only likely to gain from its political 
strategies targeted at the focal political actor who possesses the primary authority 
to influence the business activity pursued by the firm. Aggregating firms’ political 
strategies without distinguishing the political actors that these strategies target 
will obscure the effects, as political access with different political actors are 
unlikely to generate the same level of benefits.  In the empirical context of this 
study, Chinese steel firms often rely on political connections to facilitate their 
acquisitions during the industry’s consolidation. However, since the economic 
reform, authority over local economic issues like acquisition approval has shifted 
to local governments (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). Thus, only acquirers’ 
connections with the focal local government that governs the region where the 
target is located will likely aid the acquisition. The focal local government can 
provide critical information about the target, as well as facilitate regulatory 
approval. For instance, Baosteel, a leading Chinese steel producer connected with 
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the central government, approached Handan Steel in Hebei Province in 2006 for 
potential takeover. However, the deal did not go smoothly and Baosteel ended up 
withdrawing from the negotiations. Despite the central government’s support for 
Baosteel, ―much depends on the local governments, whose stance remains unclear‖ 
(Li, Li, and Yu, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A firm’s connections with the focal political actor  
positively affect firm performance. 
 
When power-sharing political actors compete with one another, the effects 
of a firm’s political strategies likely hinge on the interactions between these 
political rivals. For instance, Bonardi et al. (2005) show that the benefits from 
political strategies increase with competition between elected officials but 
decrease with competition between appointed officials. More recently, Kozhikode 
and Li (2012) show that regional political competition produces fewer benefits for 
firms when a political challenger seeks to punish the region staying loyal to the 
incumbent.  
These arguments are also consistent with competitive dynamics research that 
emphasizes the interdependent nature of competition, such that the performance 
gains from an actor’s move can be quickly erased by the response of its rivals 
(Smith et al., 2001). In particular, competitive dynamics scholars have identified 
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three underlying drivers to predict a rival’s reaction: its awareness of the 
competitive move, its motivation to respond, and its capability to carry out the 
response (Chen, 1996). While prior work has mostly focused on inter-firm rivalry 
in the marketplace, it is reasonable to expect the notion of interdependence also 
applies to nonmarket settings. When authority is shared between political actors, 
firm performance depends not only on the firm’s relation with a political actor but 
also on the relations between this political actor and other political actors in the 
government.  
More specifically, when a firm takes strategic steps to pursue a business 
activity overseen by a focal political actor, the firm’s connections with a political 
rival of that overseer may prompt a reaction to hold back the firm’s efforts. First, 
the firm’s political connections influence the focal political actor’s awareness. 
Strategic actions with high visibility tend to increase rivals’ cognizance (Chen and 
Miller, 1994). Relatedly, a firm’s connections with a rival political actor will 
likely make its action highly visible to the focal political actor and thereby raise 
awareness. Second, the focal political actor is motivated to respond, worried that 
the firm connected with a political rival will serve the rival’s interests at its 
expense. In line with these arguments, Siegel (2007) finds that firms connected 
with former rival regimes tend to be discriminated against by the regime currently 
in power. Finally, the shared authority in the government also affords the focal 
political actor the ability to respond when the business activity pursued by the 
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firm is under its oversight (Ring et al., 2005). Thus, the awareness, motivation, 
and capability of the focal political actor will incline it to counter the strategic 
moves by the firm connected with a rival political actor, resulting in lower firm 
performance.  
For instance, political economy researchers note that Chinese local 
governments compete with one another on economic performance, a key factor 
used by the central government to evaluate local officials and decide their 
political careers (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Qian and Weingast, 1997). As 
such, a focal local government may be cautious about the move by a firm 
connected with a rival local government to acquire a target firm in the focal 
region. The focal local government may worry that the acquirer will transfer 
economic resources such as investments, taxes, and jobs from the target firm in 
the focal region to the rival region, which will strengthen the rival local 
government at the expense of the focal local government. Hence, this acquirer 
will likely encounter resistance from the focal local government toward its 
acquisition. Indeed, in the empirical context of this study, it is widely reported 
that the Chinese central government’s efforts to consolidate the steel industry 
have met strong resistance from local governments because local governments 
―which enjoy tax revenue from regional steelmakers, have had difficulties in 




 Hypothesis 2 (H2): A firm’s connections with a rival political actor  
negatively affect firm performance. 
 
Intensity of political rivalry 
Research on competitive dynamics suggests that intensity of rivalry varies 
across pairs of rivals, and thus a pairwise comparison offers nuanced insights on 
rival behavior (Chen, 1996). In particular, prior research has identified ―similarity‖ 
and ―salience‖ as important drivers of competitive tension (Chen et al., 2007). 
Competitive tension is greater when rivals have similar resource profiles, and/or 
when they perceive each other as salient competitors for resources critical to their 
own capabilities. Following this research, I posit that competitive tension between 
political rivals increases as the similarity between and the salience of the political 
rivals increase. These propositions are also consistent with previous studies that 
find rivalry intensity to be associated with resource similarity and market 
commonality between rivals (Baum and Korn, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1996). 
More specifically, similarity between political rivals influences their 
awareness, motivation, and capability, which in turn drive competitive tension 
and rival behavior (Chen, 1996). First, the more similar a rival political actor to 
the focal political actor, the more aware the latter is of the former. Prior research 
shows that competitors tend to compare their own performance with that of 
similar others (Kilduff et al., 2010). Relatedly, a political actor likely focuses its 
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limited attention on those political rivals with similar profiles, as well as firms 
connected to those rivals. Further, similar rivals tend to impose greater pressure 
on one another, which increases their motivation to engage in competitive 
response (Gimeno and Woo, 1996). Finally, rivals with comparable profiles are 
more able to carry out an effective competitive response, as reactions toward 
similar rivals tend to tap into established organizational routines (Chen, 1996). 
The increased awareness, motivation, and capability of the focal political actor 
will increase its perceived competitive tension and rival behavior and thereby 
incur a greater negative effect on firms connected with the similar political rival 
(Chen et al., 2007).  
For instance, political careers of Chinese local officials are found to be 
related to their individual attributes, such as age and party tenure (Li and Zhou, 
2005; Shih, Adolph, and Liu, 2012; Xu, 2011). Top officials from a local 
jurisdiction may perceive greater competitive tension posed by counterparts of a 
rival jurisdiction with similar individual attributes, as they are likely to be 
considered for the same promotion opportunity by the central government. In such 
a situation, the focal local government officials may be particularly concerned 
about transfer of economic resources from the focal region to the rival region, as 
local economic performance bears heavily on the promotion decision by the 
central government (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). As such, an acquirer 
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connected with a similar political rival will encounter greater resistance from the 
focal local government toward its acquisition in the focal region.  
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The negative performance effect of the firm’s  
connections with a rival political actor increases with the similarity between  
the focal and rival political actors. 
 
The intensity of political rivalry is also likely influenced by the degree to 
which the focal political actor regards the rival political actor as a salient 
competitor for resources critical to itself. As noted by Chen et al. (2007, p. 106), 
―salience consideration‖ with respect to a rival’s strength in the resources of 
strategic importance to the focal actor leads it to perceive greater competitive 
tension and engage in more intensely rivalrous behavior.  
These arguments are consistent with competitive dynamics research 
suggesting that an actor perceives the moves by rivals with greater market 
commonality as being more threatening to its own market and revenue, and thus 
becomes more inclined to carry out a competitive response (Chen, 1996). For 
instance, Baum and Korn (1996) show that competitors with high market overlap 
compete for similar resources and engage in intense rival behavior. Kilduff et al. 
(2010) find that perceived intensity of rivalry is greater between geographically 
proximate rivals that compete for similar resources and identities. Relatedly, 
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Chang and Xu (2008) show that due to increased market commonality, 
competition between foreign and local firms is greater in regional markets than in 
the national market. Yu and Cannella (2007) find that multinationals with greater 
multimarket contact carry out competitive reactions more quickly. Generally, 
these studies suggest that rivals with higher market commonality are more likely 
to compete head on for similar strategic resources and experience a greater 
intensity of rivalry.  
Competition for similar critical resources can result in rivals’ greater 
awareness, motivation, and capability, which heighten the competitive tension. 
Rivals vying for similar resources likely share a similar identity domain, and 
therefore stay highly aware of one another’s actions (Livengood and Reger, 2010). 
Further, the moves made by rivals competing for similar resources are more likely 
to be labeled by the focal actor as threatening attacks on its core markets and 
resources, and lead it to perceive high valence of responding (Chen and Miller, 
1994). Finally, rivals relying on similar strategic resources tend to possess 
comparable capabilities, which enable them to undertake a swift, competitive 
response (Chen, 1996).  
Therefore, a firm will likely encounter stronger obstruction from the focal 
political actor when the firm is connected with a rival political actor that is 
regarded as a salient competitor for critical resources. For instance, inter-
jurisdictional rivalry in China tends to be more intense between regions with 
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similar economic structures, because these regions rely on similar industries for 
economic growth, tax revenue, and employment. The focal local government may 
be particularly wary of firms transferring economic resources from its region to a 
rival region sharing a similar economic structure. In such a situation, acquirers 
connected with the rival local government will likely encounter greater resistance 
in the focal region.  
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The negative performance effect of the firm’s  
connections with a rival political actor increases with the salience of the  
rival political actor with respect to the resources critical to the focal  
political actor. 
 
Coping strategies for political rivalry 
The structural relations in a government where power is shared not only 
impose challenges on firms but also provide them the opportunities to cope with 
these challenges (Macher, Mayo, and Schiffer, 2011). Recent research has begun 
to highlight the strategic implications of the institutional constraints on political 
actors imposed by other political actors (Ring et al., 2005). For instance, 
regulatory agencies operate under the oversight of the legislative and executive 
branches, and their decisions are subject to judicial review (Bonardi, Holburn, and 
Vanden Bergh, 2006). In a federal system, the national and subnational 
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governments are not always aligned in their rulings and federal laws often take 
precedence over state laws (Kozhikode and Li, 2012). Across political systems, 
the varying numbers of veto points result in different levels of constraints on 
political actors’ discretion (Henisz, 2000). As such, to cope with the negative 
effect from political rivalry, firms may turn to a political actor that lies outside the 
political rival dyad and has the ability to constrain the focal political actor’s 
behavior.  
Specifically, the constraining political actor can influence the motivation of 
the focal political actor. The focal political actor is likely to be concerned about 
the potential reactions from a constraining political actor if its own actions sway 
too far from the preferences of the constraining political actor. For instance, 
regulators collect substantial evidence in support of their proposals to avoid the 
potential loss of legitimacy resulting from their rulings being challenged by the 
courts (Bonardi et al., 2006; de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo, 2002). Further, the 
constraining political actor can weaken the focal political actor’s ability to carry 
out an effective response. Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2008) demonstrate that 
legislators and executives can limit regulators’ latitude in formulating and 
enforcing regulatory rules. As such, a firm may strategically target a constraining 
political actor to decrease the focal political actor’s motivation and ability to 
engage in behavior against the firm (Chen, 1996).  
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In the Chinese context, despite the decentralization of economic authority, 
the central government retains control over the appointment of top local officials 
(Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Xu, 2011). Hence, a firm may then turn to the 
central government to influence the focal local government. Under the separation 
of authority, the central government is unlikely to interfere with a local 
government’s decision over a specific acquisition. However, an acquirer may still 
leverage its connections with the central government to limit the local 
government’s purely politically motivated discrimination. 
 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The negative performance effect of the firm’s 
connections with a rival political actor is weakened when the firm  
possesses direct connections with a constraining political actor.    
 
In addition to directly accessing the constraining political actor, a firm 
connected with a rival political actor may also indirectly access it for assistance if 
it is allied with the firm’s directly connected rival political actor. For instance, 
research from political science shows that factional ties in China form between 
central and local officials with shared birthplace and educational institutions (Shih 
et al., 2012). Close central-local governmental relations have been associated with 
political and economic favors being granted by the central government to local 
jurisdictions (Bo, 1998; Su and Yang, 2000). As such, to fend off politically 
18 
 
motivated discrimination by a focal local government, an acquirer connected to a 
rival local government may indirectly approach the central government officials 
for support through officials from the rival local government.  
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): The negative performance effect of a firm’s  
connections with a rival political actor is weakened when the firm possesses  
indirect connections with a constraining political actor through the rival  
political actor.    
 
METHODS 
Empirical context: China’s political system 
China’s political system consists of five levels of government: central, 
provincial, prefectural, county, and township. After economic reforms began in 
1978, the former central planning system was abolished and authority over the 
local economy, such as resource allocation and investment approval, was 
delegated to local governments (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). In particular, 
provincial governments are directly managed by the central government and 
possess primary authority over the local economy. Hence, consistent with prior 
research (Bo, 1998; Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Maskin, 
Qian, and Xu, 2000), this paper focuses on the provincial governments for the 
discussion of local governments.  
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Researchers from the fields of political science and economics note that the 
reform has created both fiscal and political incentives for local officials to engage 
in inter-jurisdictional competition for economic performance. On the one hand, 
the fiscal reform since 1978 has delineated the exact proportion of tax revenue 
collected by the central and local governments, respectively, turning local 
governments into the residual claimants of local tax revenue (Yang, 2006). Along 
with more control over local revenue came increased responsibility for local 
spending. As a result, the hardened budgets greatly strengthened the link between 
local revenues and expenditures, and local governments soon found themselves 
struggling for revenues to fund their growing expenditures (Jin et al., 2005). 
These changes have led some scholars to argue that China has evolved into a de 
facto federal state characterized by local governments’ fiscal incentives and inter-
jurisdictional competition (Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997).  
On the other hand, political incentives further intensify the inter-
jurisdictional competition for economic resources (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001). 
Despite the economic decentralization, the central government retains personnel 
control over the promotion and demotion of top provincial officials by using a 
cadre evaluation system centered on local economic performance such as gross 
domestic product (GDP) and fiscal revenue growth (Chen, Li, and Zhou, 2005; 
Edin, 2003; Li and Zhou, 2005). Local economic growth and fiscal revenue are 
also linked to local jurisdictions’ status and power (Bo, 1998; Maskin et al., 2000). 
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This cadre evaluation system has helped overcome the information asymmetry 
between the central and local governments and align local officials’ behavior with 
the national priority on economic development. The central government delegates 
full discretion to local officials to manage the local economy and holds those 
officials accountable for the economic performance of local jurisdictions (Xu, 
2011).  
The economic reform has reshaped inter-governmental relations in China. 
Among provincial governments, the fiscal and political incentives lead provincial 
governments to compete for economic resources such as fiscal revenue and 
business investments, often at the expense of other provinces (Yang, 2006). 
Between the central and provincial governments, the central government has 
adopted a hand-off approach to managing the local economy and devolved most 
authority to local governments, yet retains personnel control over local officials’ 
careers (Guo, 2009). As such, local officials have considerable leeway in 
enforcing and interpreting national policies (Jin et al., 2005). As noted by Xu 
(2011, p. 1095), the Chinese political system ―makes it possible for subnational 
governments to maneuver against, rather than to simply comply with, policies of 






Data and sample 
This study focuses on the merger and acquisition activity in China’s steel 
industry from 1999 to 2010. China’s steel production reached 626.7 million 
metric tons in 2010, accounting for 44.3 percent of the world’s total production 
(Worldsteel Association, 2011). The Chinese steel industry went through 
considerable consolidation during this period (Chang, 2013). On the one hand, 
steel firms were motivated to expand in order to benefit from the economies of 
scale. Given the long construction period of new plants, acquisition provides a 
fast track for firms to tap into the existing capacity of target firms and grab market 
share. On the other hand, the central government, fearing the industrywide 
overcapacity, had repeatedly issued policies to encourage consolidation (Stanway 
and Lian, 2012). For instance, in 2005, the central government introduced a 
comprehensive industrial policy, the Iron and Steel Industry Development Policy. 
This policy included measures ranging from tighter approval of land and credit to 
firms building new capacity, to tougher production regulations that push small 
and inefficient firms to merge or shut down. These economic and policy 
incentives combined to fuel the expansion motives of steel firms and intensified 
the competition for available target firms.  
    The dataset was compiled from several sources. First, I used the China 
Steel Yearbook to identify firms in China’s steel industry. The Yearbook is 
published by the China Iron and Steel Association and lists all major steel firms in 
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China identified by industry experts and regulatory officials. According to the 
Association, the firms in the list represent about 70 percent of China’s crude steel 
production. Next, I matched firm names with the Annual Industrial Survey 
Database compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) to 
retrieve firm profiles and financial information. The Survey Database covers 
firms of all types of ownership in China and has been widely used in prior 
research (e.g., Buckley, Clegg, and Wang, 2007; Chang and Xu, 2008). By law, 
all firms were required to report to the survey if their annual sales exceeded five 
million RMB (or roughly US$760,000 based on the exchange rate in 2010). 
Finally, since information from the Survey Database is at the subsidiary level, I 
aggregated subsidiaries into a parent company, based on affiliation information 
collected from corporate Web sites.  
To collect information on acquisitions, I first obtained several lists of 
acquisitions in China’s steel industry compiled by sources including an equity 
transaction bourse, consulting firms specializing in the steel industry, and leading 
business news media in China. These lists provide the names of acquirers and 
targets and the year the acquisition was undertaken. These lists were then 
combined to cover all steel firm acquisitions from 1999 to 2010. Whenever there 
is overlap in the time period between these lists, I have crosschecked the 
acquisition information. To reconfirm the accuracy of the lists, I manually 
searched for acquisitions associated with all the major steel firms listed in the 
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Yearbook using the leading Chinese search engine, Baidu.com. The results come 
from a variety of sources including leading news media, consulting firms, 
industry research institutes, corporate Web sites, central and local governments, 
and industry associations. I read through the search results to verify the 
information for each acquisition. In most cases, the results include multiple 
sources covering the same acquisition, which allowed me to crosscheck the 
information. The final list includes 79 acquisitions undertaken by 115 steel firms 
from 1999 to 2010. In particular, the pace of merger and acquisition activity 
picked up after 2003, with the average number of acquisitions per year rising from 
2.7 during 1999 to 2004 to 10.5 during 2005 to 2010. This increase corresponds to 
the policy initiatives introduced by the central government in 2005 to facilitate 
industry consolidation as described earlier. The acquisitions were then matched 
with firm-level data from the Survey Database. The mean total assets of the target 
firms are approximately US$1.34 billion (based on the exchange rate in 2010).  
Provincial-level data were obtained from China Data Online, a database 
from the University of Michigan. Demographic and background information 
about central and provincial officials was collected from Xinhuanet.com (the Web 
site of the state-run press, Xinhua Agency) and People.com.cn (the Web site of 
the state-run newspaper, People’s Daily).  
To test the effects of acquirers’ political connections on their likelihood of 
acquisition, I constructed a sample consisting of pairs of actual acquirers and 
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actual targets along with pairs of potential acquirers and actual targets. For each 
pair of actual acquirer and actual target in an actual acquisition, I paired the actual 
target with all the other steel firms in the Yearbook list as potential acquirers. 
Since these firms were identified by industry experts and regulatory officials as 
major steel firms to be listed in the Yearbook, the potential acquirers and the 
actual acquirer that are paired with the same target likely share similar observable 
and unobservable firm characteristics. Therefore, grouping the actual acquirer-
actual target pair and the potential acquirer-actual target pairs involving the same 
target helps single out the factors that explain why some potential acquirers that 
could have acquired the target failed to succeed. As such, this pairing approach 
controls for the effects of observable and unobservable characteristics shared 
between the actual acquirer-actual target pair and the potential acquirer-actual 
target pairs involving the same target. The final sample consists of 6,638 pairs, 
including 79 actual acquirer-actual target pairs and 6,559 potential acquirer-actual 
target pairs.  
Some prior studies use an alternative approach by pairing all potential 
acquirers with all potential targets. In my data, the combination of all potential 
acquirers and all potential targets will generate more than 200,000 pairs. As noted 
by Sorenson and Stuart (2001, 2008), the current pairing approach used in this 
study offers a few advantages vis-à-vis the alternative pairing approach. First, the 
current pairing approach substantially reduces the chance of violating the 
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independence assumption across pairs, as the alternative pairing approach requires 
each firm to enter the sample many times. Second, the current approach is much 
more computationally viable, as the current sample of 6,638 pairs represents a 
mere three percent of the approximately 200,000 pairs that would be generated by 
the alternative approach of pairing all potential acquirers with all potential targets. 
Finally, although some studies using the alternative pairing approach attempt to 
address the above issues with random sampling, employing such a sampling 
method would result in reduced statistical power because the rare events of 
realized acquisitions contain most of the information needed to estimate the 
effects of covariates on acquisition likelihood. In contrast, this study includes all 
the rare events of realized acquisitions in the sample.  
 
Measurement 
Dependent variable  
Acquisition is a binary variable coded as one for the actual acquirer-actual 
target pairs, and as zero for the potential acquirer-actual target pairs.  
 
Independent variables 
In the Chinese context, corporate political strategies employed in Western 
countries, such as lobbying and campaign contribution, are either forbidden or 
unfeasible (Jia, 2014). As such, one of the most commonly used political 
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strategies by Chinese firms is to build personal connections with government 
officials through managerial service in government, the People's Congress (the 
Congress), or the People's Consultative Conference (the Conference). Public 
service in these institutions affords managers ample opportunities to develop 
connections with government officials through formal and informal personal 
interactions. For instance, Li, Meng, and Zhang (2006) find that Chinese 
entrepreneurs build political connections by serving in the Congress or the 
Conference to overcome weak economic and legal institutions. Jia (2014) 
suggests that Chinese business owners consider service in the Congress or the 
Conference as a major means to establish political connections. Li and Qian (2013) 
show that Chinese CEOs’ political connections developed through their previous 
or current service in government, the Congress, or the Conference decrease firms’ 
resistance toward corporate takeover.  
To measure firms’ political connections, I similarly searched top managers’ 
previous or current service experience in government, the Congress, and the 
Conference at both the national and provincial levels. The focus on top managers 
is consistent with prior research on political connections (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 
2007; Jia, 2014; Li and Qian, 2013; Siegel, 2007). Moreover, in China, firms’ 
representative positions in the Congress or the Conference are mostly assumed by 
the top managers. Since the vast majority of political connections in the current 
sample are associated with firms’ representative positions in the Congress and the 
27 
 
Conference, focusing on top managers allows for a consistent measure of political 
connections in this empirical context.  
More specifically, each of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions 
(including the four directly controlled municipalities) has its own provincial 
government, provincial Congress, and provincial Conference. In parallel, at the 
national level are the central government, the national Congress, and the national 
Conference. A manager serving in the provincial Congress or Conference directly 
interacts with the provincial government officials. In addition, a manager serving 
in the national Congress also enjoys access to government officials from the 
province that the manager represents, as the national Congress representatives are 
grouped based on the province they represent and these representative groups are 
led by provincial chief administrators. In contrast, representatives in the national 
Conference represent different parties and interest groups in society rather than 
any regional jurisdictions, and it is unusual for provincial chief administrators to 
hold a seat in the national Conference. Therefore, acquirer’s connections with 
focal local government is coded as one if the top manager has previous or current 
service experience as (a) an official in the provincial government of the focal 
province where the target firm is located, (b) a representative in the provincial 
Congress or Conference of the focal province, (c) a representative representing 
the focal province in the national Congress, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
acquirer’s connections with rival local government is coded as one if the top 
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manager has previous or current service experience as (a) an official in the 
provincial government of another province other than the focal province, (b) a 
representative in the provincial Congress or Conference of another province, (c) a 
representative representing another province in the national Congress, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Moderators and control variables 
To measure the similarity between the focal and rival political actors, I 
compared the profiles between the chief administrators of the focal and rival 
provinces. In China, the chief administrators in provincial governments are the 
party secretary and the governor (Guo, 2009). Research in the fields of economics 
and political science finds the promotion of Chinese officials to be linked to their 
personal attributes, such as age and tenure of membership in the China 
Communist Party (Guo, 2009; Li and Zhou, 2005; Shih et al., 2012; Xu, 2011). In 
the same fashion, I focused on age and party tenure of provincial chief 
administrators to assess their similarity. Political competition is likely to be more 
intense within the cohort of local officials of similar age and party tenure rather 
than across cohorts of different age and party tenure because chief administrators 
from competing provinces of comparable age and party tenure are more likely to 
be considered by the central government for the same position. To account for this, 
I first calculated the difference in age and the difference in tenure of party 
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membership between party secretaries and between governors. Next, these 
difference numbers for age and party tenure were added up for party secretary and 
governor, respectively. Finally, to calculate rival-focal similarity, I reverse coded 
the sum of age and party tenure differences between party secretaries and between 
governors.  
To measure the salience of a rival political actor in competing for resources 
critical to the focal political actor, I compared the economic structure between the 
focal and rival provinces. The more similar the economic structure between the 
two provinces, the more likely the two provincial governments depend on similar 
industrial sectors to generate economic growth, tax revenue, and jobs, and thereby 
are more likely to engage in tight competition for similar business investments. 
For instance, a province whose economy relies on the service sector is less likely 
to compete for the same type of economic resources and business investments 
with a province whose economy depends on the industrial manufacturing sector. 
As such, I obtained the percentage share of the industrial sector’s contribution to 
the annual GDP for each province, and calculated the difference in the percentage 
between the focal and rival provinces. Finally, this percentage difference was 
reverse coded to calculate rival salience.  
To measure firms’ connections with the constraining political actor, I coded 
acquirer’s direct connections with central government as one if the top manager 
has previous or current service experience as (a) an official in the central 
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government, (b) a representative in the national Congress or the national 
Conference, and zero otherwise. Service experience in these government branches 
affords managers ample opportunities to build connections with central 
government officials through formal and informal personal interactions.  
Apart from firms’ direct connections with the central government, close 
personal relations between provincial and central government officials likely 
provide firms with indirect access to the central government. For instance, 
personal ties between provincial officials and party leaders have been found to 
impact the share of central government resources allocated to the province (Su 
and Yang, 2000) and the promotion of local officials (Shih et al., 2012). 
Moreover, factional ties are shown to form between provincial chief 
administrators and central government leaders through birthplace connections and 
school ties (Shih et al., 2012). In the Chinese political context, the Central 
Politburo represents the highest power in the Communist Party and the central 
government (Bo, 1998). Hence, to measure a firm’s indirect connections with the 
central government via its connected provincial government, I compared the 
birthplace of and the college attended by provincial chief administrators and the 
Politburo members. Specifically, I first calculated the percentage of Politburo 
members who were born in the same province as the rival provincial 
government’s party secretary and governor, respectively. I then added these two 
percentages to measure birthplace similarity between the Politburo members and 
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the rival provincial government’s chief administrators. Similarly, I calculated 
educational similarity between the Politburo members and the rival provincial 
government’s chief administrators. Finally, acquirer’s indirect connections with 
central government is measured as the sum of birthplace similarity and 
educational similarity as calculated above.  
In addition, I also controlled for acquirer size as the log form of the 
acquirer’s total assets, acquirer SOE as a dummy that indicates whether the 
acquirer is a state-owned company, and acquirer liquidity as the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities. Geographical distance is the distance between an 
acquirer’s headquarters and a target’s headquarters, acquirer province GDP is the 
log form of the province’s GDP where an acquirer is headquartered, and acquirer 
provincial officials in Politburo is another dummy to indicate whether the chief 
administrators of the provincial government to which the acquirer is connected sit 
in the Politburo. 
 
Analysis 
As described earlier, the sample comprises actual acquirer-actual target pairs 
for acquisitions that occurred, and potential acquirer-actual target pairs for 
acquisitions that could have occurred but did not. Since both the actual and 
potential acquirers paired with the same target are major steel firms identified by 
industry experts and regulatory officials listed in the Yearbook, these firms likely 
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share similar observable and unobservable attributes. As such, controlling the 
fixed effect of the set of pairs for actual and potential acquisitions involving the 
same target firm will account for the unobserved factors shared across these pairs 
within the same set, thereby producing unbiased estimates conditional on these 
unobserved factors (Rogan and Sorenson, 2014; Sorenson and Stuart, 2008).  
Given the structure of the dataset and the binary dependent variable, a 
conditional logit model was used to analyze these sets of pairs. The conditional 
logit model treats the utility of choices as a function of attributes of choice 
alternatives rather than attributes of firms that make the choice decisions 
(McFadden, 1973). The conditional logit model is fundamentally the same as the 
fixed-effects logit model, and is appropriate when the number of choices is large. 
The propositions in this study are whether the attributes of acquirers—specifically 
the acquirers’ political connections—can lead the focal provincial government to 
support or resist the efforts to acquire a target located in the focal province, 
thereby affecting the likelihood of acquisition. Hence, I used the conditional logit 
model to model the acquisition as a function of the political connections of 
acquirers in the choice set (i.e., no connections, connections with the focal 
provincial government, or connections with a rival provincial government), while 
controlling for the common factors shared across the actual acquirer-actual target 
pair and potential acquirer-actual target pairs within the set involving the same 
target firm (Rogan and Sorenson, 2014).   
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In addition, year fixed effects were included in all analyses. Independent 
variables, moderating variables, and control variables were lagged by one year. 
To handle potential heteroskedasticity issues, all models were estimated using the 
robust estimator of variance. The conditional logit model in this study can be 
specified as follows:  
 
   
           
             
 
 
where    denotes the likelihood of acquisition for pair i,   denotes the 
intercept for set k, which includes the actual acquirer-actual target pair and 
potential acquirer-actual target pairs involving target k, β denotes the coefficient 
vector, and x denotes the vector of covariates including acquirer-, provincial-, and 




Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in 
this study. Table 2 presents the results of the conditional logit regression models 
predicting firms’ likelihood of acquisition. Models 1‒7 test the propositions 
regarding the main and moderating effects. Model 8 is the full model that includes 
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all variables. The pseudo R-squared falls in the range of 0.44 to 0.51, suggesting 
good predictive ability of the models.   
In Model 1, the coefficient of acquirer’s connections with focal local 
government is positive and significant, supporting Hypothesis 1 predicting that 
firms benefit from their connections with a focal political actor. In Model 2, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of acquirer’s connections with rival 
local government is negative and significant, indicating the negative effect of 
firms’ connections with a rival political actor. Model 3 includes both connections 
with the focal and rival local governments. Similar to Models 1 and 2, the results 
reveal a positive and marginally significant effect of connections with the focal 
local government, as well as a negative and significant effect of connections with 
a rival local government, thereby supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
[INSERT TABLES 1‒3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Models 4‒5 test the interaction effect between firms’ connections with a 
rival political actor and the intensity of political rivalry. In Model 4, consistent 
with Hypothesis 3a, the coefficient of interaction between acquirer’s connections 
with rival local government and rival-focal similarity is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the similarity between the focal and rival political actors heightens 
the intensity of the rivalry and amplifies the negative effect experienced by firms 
connected with the rival political actor. In Model 5, the results show a negative 
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and significant interaction effect between acquirer’s connections with rival local 
government and rival salience. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 3b that the 
salience of a rival political actor competing with the focal political actor for 
critical resources results in more intense political rivalry and incurs greater harm 
on firms connected with the rival political actor.  
Models 6‒7 test the propositions on firms’ coping strategies. In Model 6, the 
results confirm Hypothesis 4a and reveal a positive and significant interaction 
effect between acquirer’s connections with rival local government and acquirer’s 
direct connections with central government. This finding indicates firms can 
directly access the constraining political actor to fend off the negative effect 
exerted by the focal political actor. In Model 7, the positive and significant 
interaction effect between acquirer’s connections with rival local government and 
acquirer’s indirect connections with central government supports Hypothesis 4b. 
This suggests that firms can also neutralize the negative effect by indirectly 
accessing the constraining political actor via their directly connected political 
actors.   
Model 8 is the full model. The results show similar patterns as Models 1‒7, 
although the coefficients of acquirer’s connections with focal local government 
and of the interaction between acquirer’s connections with rival local government 
and acquirer’s indirect connections with central government turn insignificant.  
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In nonlinear models, an explanatory variable’s marginal effect depends on 
both the variable’s coefficient and the value of all variables in the model, and 
analyses on the marginal effect can facilitate interpretation of the results (Hoetker, 
2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). Therefore, supplementary analyses on the 
marginal effects were conducted based on the regression results from Models 3‒
7.
1
 Regarding the main effect, the results show the value of the marginal effect of 
acquirer’s connections with rival local government is negative and significant at 
the mean value of all other variables, thereby supporting Hypothesis 2. However, 
the value of the marginal effect of acquirer’s connections with foal local 
government is positive but not significant.  
Table 3 presents the results of marginal effects analyses on the moderating 
effects. To compare the effects of firms’ connections with a rival political actor 
when the similarity between the focal and rival political actors is high versus 
when it is low, high (low) rival-focal similarity is defined as the value of one 
standard deviation above (below) its mean value. The results show that the 
marginal effect of acquirer’s connections with rival local government is negative 
and significant when rival-focal similarity is high. In contrast, the marginal effect 
becomes positive and significant when rival-focal similarity is low. These 
                                                          
1
 Since the conditional logit model omits intercepts, the supplementary analyses on the marginal 
effects of explanatory variables are based on estimation results from the logit model using the 
same model specification as in Table 2. Year fixed effects were included and robust estimator of 
variance was used. The regression results from the logit model are consistent with results from the 
conditional logit model in Table 2.  
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findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3a that the negative effect of firms’ 
connections with a rival political actor increases with the similarity between the 
focal and rival political actors. In particular, the positive marginal effect in the 
results when rival-focal similarity is low may reflect the support from the rival 
provincial government to its connected acquirer such as superior access to 
financial capital. These benefits are likely manifest in the acquisition outcome 
only when the competitive tension is low and the resistance from the focal 
provincial government is weakened.  
To compare the marginal effects of firms’ connections with a rival political 
actor when the salience of the rival political actor in competing with the focal 
political actor for similar critical resources is high versus when it is low, high 
(low) rival salience is defined as the value of one standard deviation above 
(below) its mean value. The results show that the marginal effect of acquirer’s 
connections with rival local government is negative and significant when the rival 
salience is high. In contrast, the marginal effect is positive and significant when 
rival salience is low. These findings support Hypothesis 3b that a firm connected 
with a rival political actor suffers greater negative effect when the focal political 
actor perceives the rival political actor to be a salient competitor with regard to 
resources of strategic value.  
Finally, in line with the propositions on the coping strategies, the results 
show that the acquirer’s connections with the rival local government has a 
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negative and significant marginal effect when the acquirers lack direct or indirect 
connections with the central government. In contrast, the marginal effect becomes 
insignificant when the acquirers possess direct or indirect access to the central 
government. These findings confirm Hypotheses 4a and 4b, suggesting that firms 
suffering from the negative impact of political rivalry can directly or indirectly 
turn to a constraining political actor who can limit the politically motivated 
discrimination exerted by the focal political actor against the firms.  
 
Robustness tests 
First, a concern over the interpretation of the results is a potential for 
endogeneity. More specifically, political connections can be endogenous if a firm 
can appoint a representative of the Congress or the Conference to be its top 
manager. However, in the present empirical context, this is unlikely to be a major 
issue with respect to the interpretation of the results. Contrary to the concern 
about firms’ strategic appointment of politically connected managers, most 
managers in China attain their membership in the Congress or the Conference 
after assuming the top manager position in the companies (Li, Meng, and Zhou, 
2008). Since the vast majority of managers’ political connections in my sample 
were formed through managerial service in the Congress or the Conference, the 
results are unlikely to be driven by firms’ strategic appointment of top managers 
in anticipation of acquisitions. Supplementary empirical analyses were conducted 
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with alternative measures of firms’ political connections that included only 
managers’ service in the Congress or the Conference and excluded managers’ 
government work experience. As such, the measures included only those political 
connections formed after the appointment of top managers. The results from the 
regression analyses remain consistent with those in Table 2.    
Second, to reconfirm the empirical findings, further analyses were conducted 
to examine the heterogeneous effects of political connections based on the size of 
the target firm. If the logic in this study holds, the focal local government should 
perceive greater interests at stake when the target firm is larger, as larger firms 
tend to be associated with a greater amount of economic output, fiscal revenue, 
and employment in the focal jurisdiction. Thus, the focal local government is 
more likely to favor its connected acquirers and obstruct acquirers connected to 
political rivals. Accordingly, when the target firm is larger, both the positive 
effect of acquirers’ connections with the focal local government and the negative 
effect of acquirers’ connections with the rival local government are expected to be 
stronger.  
Following prior research methods (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011, 2013), I 
added two variables in Model 1 in Table 4 while dropping acquirer’s connections 
with focal local government: acquirer’s connections with focal local government 
when acquiring a large target, which is equal to acquirer’s connections with focal 
local government if the target’s size is above its sample median, and is equal to 
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zero if the target’s size is below its sample median; acquirer’s connections with 
focal local government when acquiring a small target, which is equal to 
acquirer’s connections with focal local government if the target’s size is below its 
sample median, and is equal to zero if the target’s size is above its sample median. 
The results show a positive and significant coefficient of acquirer’s connections 
with focal local government when acquiring a large target. In contrast, the 
coefficient of acquirer’s connections with focal local government when acquiring 
a small target is not significant. These findings support the argument that the 
focal local government is more likely to aid its connected firms in acquiring larger 
targets in the focal jurisdiction.  
Similarly, in Model 2, I added two variables while dropping acquirer’s 
connections with rival local government: acquirer’s connections with rival local 
government when acquiring a large target and acquirer’s connections with rival 
local government when acquiring a small target. The results show that the 
coefficient of acquirer’s connections with rival local government when acquiring 
a large target is negative and significant, but the coefficient of acquirer’s 
connections with rival local government when acquiring a small target is not 
significant. These support the argument that the focal local government is more 
likely to resist acquisition attempts by firms connected to rival governments when 
the target firm is larger. Taken together, these findings suggest that political 
capital matters more for large targets where the stakes are higher.  
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Finally, the effect of political connections may also vary depending on the 
target firm’s connections with the focal local government. The propositions in this 
study suggest that the performance effects of political connections are driven by 
the intervention from the focal local government. Following these arguments, the 
magnitude of the performance effects should hinge on the degree of influence that 
the focal local government has over the target firm. Such influence may be 
stronger when the target is politically connected with the focal local government, 
since the connections likely result in a power-dependence relation that makes the 
target more likely subject to government intervention. Thus, the effects of 
acquirers’ political connections will be stronger when the target is connected with 
the focal local government.  
Empirically, a target firm’s political connections with the focal local 
government are measured in the same way as the acquirers’ political connections, 
as illustrated earlier. In Model 3 in Table 4, I added two variables while dropping 
acquirer’s connections with focal local government: acquirer’s connections with 
focal local government when acquiring a target with connections to focal local 
government, which is equal to acquirer’s connections with focal local government 
if the target firm has connections with the focal local government, and is equal to 
zero if the target firm does not have connections; acquirer’s connections with 
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focal local government when acquiring a target without connections to focal local 
government, which is equal to acquirer’s connections with focal local government 
if the target firm does not have connections with the focal local government, and 
is equal to zero if the target has connections. The results show the coefficient of 
acquirer’s connections with focal local government when acquiring a target with 
connections to focal local government is positive and significant, but the 
coefficient of acquirer’s connections with focal local government when acquiring 
a target without connections to focal local government is not significant. These 
findings support the argument that acquirers are more likely to benefit from their 
connections with the focal local government when the target is subject to stronger 
influence from the focal local government.  
In a similar fashion, in Model 4, I added two variables while dropping 
acquirer’s connections with rival local government: acquirer’s connections with 
rival local government when acquiring a target with connections to focal local 
government and acquirer’s connections with rival local government when 
acquiring a target without connections to focal local government. The results 
show that both coefficients are negative and marginally significant. These 
findings suggest that acquirers connected with rival local governments encounter 
obstruction from the focal local government regardless of whether or not the 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study examines both the positive and negative performance effects of 
firms’ political strategies, contingent on the structural relations among political 
actors. Using a dataset of acquisitions by Chinese steel firms during the industry’s 
consolidation from 1999 to 2010, this paper shows that an acquirer’s connections 
with the focal provincial government governing the target firm facilitated its 
acquisition, but an acquirer’s connections with a rival provincial government 
hindered its acquisition. The negative effect of the acquirer’s connections with the 
rival provincial government became more pronounced when the chief 
administrators of the focal and rival provincial governments possessed similar 
profiles, which put them into a closer political race, and/or when the two 
provinces competed for similar economic resources, which increased the salience 
of the political rival. Finally, the acquirer could neutralize the negative effect from 
political rivalry by employing its direct or indirect connections with the central 
government to limit the politically motivated discrimination by the focal 
provincial government.  
 
Theoretical implications 
This study improves our understanding of the performance effects of 
corporate political strategies (Bonardi et al., 2006; Hillman, 2005). With the focus 
on the structural relations among political actors within the government, this 
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paper accounts for both the positive and negative effects of political strategies and 
thereby offers an alternative lens to reconcile the mixed empirical evidence in 
extant literature (Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang, 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013; 
Shaffer, Quasney, and Grimm, 2000). In particular, the degree of the negative 
effect is found to vary with the different levels of competitive tension as driven by 
the similarity between and the salience of political rivals. As such, this more fine-
grained perspective helps identify the situations under which political access may 
become a liability for firms.  
Further, this study shows that the structural relations among political actors 
provide firms with the opportunities to strategically cope with the challenges 
imposed by political rivalry in the government. The negative impact of political 
rivalry is found to be neutralized by firms’ connections to a constraining political 
actor that lies outside the political rival dyad and has the ability to limit the focal 
political actor’s behavior. In particular, firms can access the constraining political 
actor either directly or indirectly through other political actors allied with it. 
These findings are consistent with recent corporate political strategy research that 
has begun to highlight the strategic implications of the institutional constraints on 
political actors (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008; Macher and Mayo, 2012) 
This research also advances the competitive dynamics literature (Chen, 1996; 
Smith et al., 2001). Prior research has mostly focused on inter-firm rivalry and the 
performance effects of market strategies (Chen and Miller, 1994). Extending the 
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competitive dynamics perspective into the political context, this study analyzes 
the awareness, motivation, and capability of political actors, and assesses the 
performance effects of firms’ nonmarket strategies. Consistent with the notion of 
competitive interdependence that the effects of a firm’s strategies should be 
examined within the competitive context and relative to its rivals’ reactions 
(Haleblian et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2001), this paper reveals that the effects of a 
firm’s nonmarket strategies depend on the political context where various political 
actors compete with and constrain one another. As such, in line with emerging 
research that extends competitive dynamics theory beyond market boundaries 
(Capron and Chatain, 2008; Markman et al., 2009), this paper links the 
competitive dynamics perspective to nonmarket strategy literature.  
Finally, this paper corresponds to the recent shift of focus in competitive 
dynamics research toward the role of individual decision makers (Chen et al., 
2007; Tsai, Su, and Chen, 2011). Some recent competitive dynamics work has 
begun to explicitly analyze the perception and motivation of individual decision 
makers as the drivers of actions made by their organizations. In this paper, I 
examine how politicians’ concerns over their political careers influence their 
behavior toward politically connected firms. As such, this study advances this 
emerging literature to explore the potential of competitive dynamics theory in 
bridging micro- and macro-perspectives in organization research (Chen and 




In contrast to the conventional wisdom that emphasizes the benefits of 
political access, this paper shows political connections to be both assets and 
liabilities for firms. Where government power is shared, political access may 
backfire when the firm connected with one political actor needs support from a 
rival political actor. Hence, firms building access to one government branch or 
political faction for certain benefits should be aware of the potential costs their 
political connections may incur when dealing with a competing branch or faction. 
Firms can assess the magnitude of the potential costs by gauging the competitive 
tension between political rivals. In particular, this paper finds the similarity 
between and the salience of political rivals as two factors driving the intensity of 
political rivalry.  
Furthermore, managers can strategically take advantage of the institutional 
constraints imposed by the structural relations among political actors. For instance, 
the findings in the study suggest that when a firm suffers politically motivated 
discrimination by a focal political actor, it may consider directly or indirectly 
turning to a constraining political actor that can weaken the focal political actor’s 






Limitations and future research 
Limitations of this study present opportunities for future research. First, 
since it is difficult to obtain consistent information on informal political 
connections (Jia, 2014; Xin and Pearce, 1996), this study focuses on firms’ formal 
political connections. Although this approach is consistent with previous research 
on political strategies (e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 1999; Jia, 2014; Li 
and Qian, 2013), future studies may measure informal political connections in 
other contexts. For example, Faccio (2006) includes the factor of friendship 
between politicians and executives. Such research can provide interesting 
comparison with the findings from this paper. Logically, the lower visibility 
associated with firms’ informal political connections may decrease the awareness 
of political rivals and weaken the negative effect experienced by firms.  
Further, while this study suggests some coping strategies to neutralize the 
negative effect from political rivalry, future studies can fruitfully explore other 
strategies for firms to not only fend off the harms but also to enhance the benefits 
from their political strategies. Moreover, it would be interesting to examine other 
firm characteristics that may affect the magnitude of benefits and costs of political 
strategies. 
Finally, this study has opened up new avenues to integrate competitive 
dynamics theory to nonmarket strategy literature. For instance, the findings 
suggest that the performance effects of a firm’s political strategies depend on 
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reactions from political rivals of the firm’s directly connected political actor. To 
advance this line of inquiry, it would be worthwhile to investigate how the 
performance effects of a focal firm’s political strategies are affected by 












Table 1.1. Summary statistics and correlation table 
 
Variables  Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. Acquisition 0.01 0.11 1.00             
2. Acquirer’s connections with focal local govt 0.03 0.18 0.27 1.00            
3. Acquirer’s connections with rival local govt 0.42 0.49 -0.04 -0.16 1.00           
4. Rival-focal similarity -20.35 11.26 0.12 0.33 -0.14 1.00          
5. Rival salience -6.27 5.63 0.06 0.21 -0.10 0.23 1.00         
6. Acquirer’s direct connections with central govt 0.27 0.45 0.08 0.16 0.43 0.02 -0.02 1.00        
7. Acquirer’s indirect connections with central govt 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 1.00       
8. Acquirer size 15.64 1.67 0.12 0.08 0.35 0.04 0.01 0.39 -0.10 1.00      
9. Acquirer SOE 0.56 0.50 0.04 -0.05 0.22 -0.12 -0.16 0.05 -0.12 0.39 1.00     
10. Acquirer liquidity 6.00 123.56 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 1.00    
11. Geographical distance 0.83 0.54 -0.08 -0.22 0.11 -0.26 -0.35 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.15 -0.01 1.00   
12. Acquirer province GDP 9.01 0.84 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.16 0.18 0.10 -0.08 0.15 -0.38 0.06 -0.18 1.00  
13 Acquirer provincial officials in Politburo 0.07 0.25 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 1.00 
 











Table 1.2. Conditional logit estimates of firms’ likelihood of acquisition 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Acquirer’s connections with focal 















Acquirer’s connections with rival 















Acquirer’s connections with rival 
local govt X Rival-focal similarity 
(H3a) 
   -0.187*** 
(0.047) 
   -0.127*** 
(0.036) 
Acquirer’s connections with rival 
local govt X Rival salience (H3b) 
    -0.442** 
(0.150) 
  -0.275** 
(0.084) 
Acquirer’s connections with rival 
local govt X Acquirer’s direct 
connections with central govt (H4a) 




Acquirer’s connections with rival 
local govt X Acquirer’s indirect 
connections with central govt (H4b) 






















































Acquirer’s indirect connections 



















































                  Table 1.2. (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































































Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,638 6,638 6,638 6,638 6,638 6,638 6,638 6,638 
Log pseudo likelihood  -196.218 -196.94 -194.788 -183.315 -183.697 -190.622 -191.692 -173.799 
Pseudo R-squared 0.443 0.441 0.447 0.479 0.478 0.459 0.456 0.506 
 
                       + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 













Table 1.3. The effects of rival-focal similarity, rival salience, and acquirer’s 
direct and indirect connections with central government on the marginal 
effect of acquirer’s connections with rival local government 
 
 
Marginal effect of Acquirer’s 
connections with rival local 
government 
z-statistic 
Low rival-focal similarity 





Low rival salience 





Acquirer with direct connections with central govt 





Acquirer with indirect connections with central govt 






+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
N = 6638. 



























Table 1.4. Heterogeneous effects of the acquirer’s political connections based on 
the target’s size and political connections 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Target firm size Target firm’s political 
connections 









Acquirer’s connections with focal local govt when 
acquiring a large target 
1.216* 
(0.522) 
   
Acquirer’s connections with focal local govt when 
acquiring a small target 
0.468 
(0.604) 
   
Acquirer’s connections with rival local govt when 




Acquirer’s connections with rival local govt when 




Acquirer’s connections with focal local govt when 
acquiring a target with connections to focal local govt 
  1.903** 
(0.625) 
 
Acquirer’s connections with focal local govt when 
acquiring a target without connections to focal local govt 
  0.536 
(0.528) 
 
Acquirer’s connections with rival local govt when 
acquiring a target with connections to focal local govt 
   -0.726+ 
(0.398) 
Acquirer’s connections with rival local govt when 
acquiring a target without connections to focal local govt 
   -0.694+ 
(0.395) 
















































































Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,638 6,638 6,638 6,638 
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Table 1.4. (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Target firm size 
 
Target firm’s political 
connections 
Log pseudo likelihood -194.036 -194.588 -192.771 -194.786 
Pseudo R-squared 0.449 0.447 0.453 0.447 
 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 






















CHAPTER 2: THE SIGNALING VALUE OF POLITICAL STRATEGY: 
PUBLIC PATRONAGE AND FIRMS’ ACCESS  
TO EXTERNAL RESOURCES 
ABSTRACT 
Prior research suggests that firms benefit from political strategies through 
direct mechanisms such as obtaining government-controlled resources and 
favorable legislation. In this study, I propose an indirect mechanism through 
which political strategies generate signaling value. In particular, I argue that 
public patronage in the form of public visits to firms by government officials 
serves to signal the firms’ quality, government favor, and/or legitimacy to third-
party resource holders, thereby enhancing firms’ access to external resources. 
Moreover, while prior research finds diminished value of political strategies 
generated through direct mechanisms when government control over markets 
weakens, I argue that the signaling value of public patronage increases in such 
situations. Results from a unique dataset on official visits to Chinese steel firms 









A growing body of research has examined firms’ political strategies to shape 
public policy decisions for advancing private interests (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Kozhikode and Li, 2012; Macher and Mayo, 2012; Zheng, Singh, and Mitchell, 
forthcoming). Previous research shows that firms employ political strategies such 
as lobbying and political contribution to gain benefits including government-
controlled resources and favorable legislation (Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005; 
Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). In part due to data limitations, this research 
focuses on direct mechanisms through which political strategies generate benefits 
to firms, and suggests that these benefits diminish when government control over 
markets weakens (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005; Jia, 2014). In this 
paper, I propose an alternative, indirect mechanism through which political 
strategies generate signaling value for firms. In particular, I examine how public 
patronage in the form of public visits to firms by government officials conveys 
signals to third-party resource holders and thereby enhances firms’ access to 
external resources.  
I draw upon signaling theory (Spence, 1974; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) 
and research on interorganizational endorsements (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Stuart, 
Hoang, and Hybels, 1999) to develop hypotheses on the effects of public 
patronage. Specifically, I argue that public patronage provides signals on a firm’s 
quality, government favor, and/or legitimacy, which in turn help mitigate the 
uncertainty regarding the firm faced by third-party resource holders and thereby 
facilitate the firm’s access to external resources. More importantly, while prior 
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research suggests diminished benefits generated by political strategies through 
direct mechanisms when government intervention in markets decreases, I argue 
that the signaling value of public patronage increases when government has less 
control over the allocation of resources. Finally, the signaling effect weakens 
when certain organizational attributes convey direct and objective information 
about the firm which renders signals generated by public patronage redundant.  
To test the hypotheses, I assembled a unique dataset that comprehensively 
covers public visits by government officials to firms in China’s steel industry 
between 1995 and 2009. I combined the data with firm- and region-level 
information to examine the effects of public patronage on firms’ access to long-
term credit. This empirical setting is ideal for the present study for two reasons. 
First, long-term credit is a key resource in this capital-intensive industry, yet 
lending is often impeded due to significant risks that creditors face (Zhang and 
Wang, 2013). As such, signals generated by public patronage likely help redress 
creditors’ uncertainty about firms and thereby affect their lending decisions. 
Second, local government officials in China have formal and informal influence 
over creditors — bank branches, for instance — in their jurisdictions. However, 
financial sector reform during the 1990s significantly weakened local officials’ 
ability to influence creditors’ lending decisions. As a result, the actual level of 
local government control over credit markets varies substantially across regions 
and over time (Jia, 2014; Tao and Yang, 2008; Xu, 2011). As such, this context 
provides the advantage of allowing me to test how signaling effects vary with the 
level of government control over markets.  
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This study makes three contributions. First, by examining the signaling value 
of public patronage, this paper extends the research on corporate political 
strategies (Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Jia, 2014). 
Much of the work has focused on benefits generated by political strategies 
through direct mechanisms such as obtaining government-controlled resources 
and favorable regulation. Using a unique dataset on official visits to firms, this 
paper unveils an alternative, indirect mechanism through which political strategies 
engender signaling value in facilitating firms’ access to external resources. 
Second, while prior research has shown diminished benefits generated by political 
strategies through direct mechanisms when government control over markets 
weakens (e.g. Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005), this study suggests that 
the benefits generated by public patronage through the indirect signaling 
mechanism increases in such situations. As such, this work complements and 
contrasts with previous research and contributes to a more complete 
understanding of the contingent value of political strategies. Finally, this paper 
advances upon research on interorganizational endorsements (Baum and Oliver, 
1991; Podolny, 1993; Stuart et al., 1999). Prior research shows that a firm’s 
relationships with prominent organizations serve to signal and certify the firm’s 
quality and legitimacy to external resource holders, which in turn facilitate the its 
access to resources. By focusing on official visits to firms as an alternative form 
of interorganizational endorsement, this paper builds upon this literature and 
suggests that the value of such endorsements is contingent on the level of 
endorser control over third-party resource holders.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Prior research has extensively analyzed how political strategies benefit firms 
through direct mechanisms. For example, firms engage in lobbying and campaign 
contribution to build political access, which enables them to obtain favorable 
legislation and government-controlled resources such as government contracts 
(Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh, 2006; Schuler et al., 2002). In developing 
economies, political ties help firms overcome underdeveloped legal and market 
institutions (Peng and Luo, 2000). For instance, politically connected firms are 
found to receive a greater amount of financial resources through government-
controlled institutions (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li, Meng, and Zhou, 2008). 
While this stream of research focuses on benefits generated by political strategies 
through direct mechanisms, this paper explores an alternative, indirect mechanism 
through which political strategies generate signaling value for firms.  
Specifically, I argue that public patronage in the form of public visits to 
firms by government officials conveys signals to third-party resource holders such 
as creditors on the firms’ quality, government favor, and/or legitimacy, thus 
facilitating the firms’ access to external resources. First, public patronage serves 
to signal a firm’s quality. Asymmetric information between a firm and its 
potential exchange partners results in the partners’ uncertainty about the firm’s 
quality, thus hindering economic exchange. In response, a firm can signal its 
superior quality by engaging in activities that are costly for its low-quality 
competitors to imitate (Spence, 1974; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). In particular, 
a substantial body of research suggests that interorganizational endorsements can 
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generate signals on a firm’s quality, such as certifications with the ISO 
management standards (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Terlaak and King, 2006) 
and partnerships with prestigious venture capitalists (VCs) (Gulati and Higgins, 
2003). In a similar vein, public patronage can likewise provide such signals, as it 
is not only visible to third parties but also in limited supply and costly to obtain. 
The government bodies that regulate a firm likely possess superior access to 
information regarding the firm’s quality. Further, officials are likely selective in 
their visits to firms, since their public associations with low-quality firms can 
damage their own reputation. Thus, public patronage might serve to signal the 
government’s certification of a firm’s quality, which in turn helps mitigate the 
uncertainty faced by third-party resource holders such as creditors about the 
firm’s quality. 
Further, public patronage likely signals the government’s favor toward a 
firm, which helps convince third-party resource holders of the firm’s access to 
government-controlled resources and its future prospects. Prior research suggests 
that firms’ linkages with prominent exchange partners reveal their access to 
valuable resources possessed by the partners and thus enhance third-party 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the firms’ future prospects (Stuart et al., 
1999). For instance, young firms’ affiliations with prominent VCs can lead other 
investors to perceive that the firms enjoy superior access to valuable resources 
possessed by the VCs (Gulati and Higgins, 2003). In the same fashion, public 
patronage might signal a firm’s ability to obtain favorable policy decisions and 
government-controlled resources such as government contracts, business licenses, 
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and tax breaks (Hillman et al., 2004). Moreover, firms favored by the government 
are also more likely to receive government bailouts when they are in financial 
trouble (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006). Therefore, third-party resource 
holders such as creditors will likely perceive lower risk involved in their 
transactions with the firms.  
Finally, public patronage may enhance a firm’s legitimacy and status in the 
eyes of third-party resource holders. Organizational scholars have suggested that 
firms with higher legitimacy and status attract more resources from external social 
constituents (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Podolny, 
1993). This research relates directly to the Matthew effect whereby high status 
actors extract greater awards than their low status peers for performing an 
identical task (Merton, 1968). In particular, firms can enhance their legitimacy 
and status by associating with social actors with established legitimacy and status, 
such as regulatory agencies (Baum and Oliver, 1991), media (Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003), and prominent alliance partners (Higgins and Gulati, 2006). In 
contrast to economic views that associate signals with firms’ underlying quality, 
organizational scholars have emphasized the symbolic value of 
interorganizational endorsements and their weak connection to firms’ actual 
quality (Certo, 2003; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). As such, given the established 
legitimacy and status of the government (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 
1999), public patronage likely generates signals that enhance the legitimacy and 
status of the firm in the eyes of third-party resource holders.  
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In sum, I propose that public patronage will facilitate a firm’s access to 
external resources by generating signals on the firm’s quality, government favor, 
and/or legitimacy to third-party resource holders such as creditors. For instance, 
in the present context, managers of Chinese firms are reported to seek official 
visits through inspection and attendance at opening ceremonies and then use the 
pictures in public relations and advertisements to increase their access to 
resources such as bank loans (Liu, 2002; Ma, 2006). Indeed, the former Vice 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress Cheng Siwei 
once cautioned Chinese managers to ―create wealth through capabilities rather 
than pictures‖ (Liao, 2006). Thus, I hypothesize,  
 
Hypothesis 1.Public patronage increases a firm’s access to external  
resources.  
 
The extent to which firms benefit from their political strategies depends on 
political actors’ discretion over resource allocation and policy making (Henisz, 
2000; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008; Macher and Mayo, 2012; Peng and 
Heath, 1996). In particular, prior research suggests that when government 
intervention in markets weakens, the value of political strategies will diminish as 
political actors have less discretion to provide benefits to firms. For instance, 
Hillman (2005) finds that appointing former politicians as board members 
generates fewer benefits for firms in less regulated industries than in more 
regulated industries. Nee and Opper (2010) show that political capital is less 
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valuable when allocation of resources is determined by market competition as 
opposed to government intervention. Consistent with these findings, Jia (2014) 
suggests that firms’ tendency to employ political actions increases when the state 
has greater redistributive power in resource markets. Similarly, other studies have 
found that firms’ political connections generate more benefits when market and 
legal institutions are weaker and government intervention is stronger (Bai, Lu, 
and Tao, 2006; Li et al., 2008).  
While this body of research focuses on the decreased benefits generated by 
political strategies through direct mechanisms, I argue that the value of public 
patronage generated through the indirect signaling mechanism will increase when 
government has less control over allocation of resources in the market. 
Specifically, third-party resource holders are more likely to attend to and base 
their decisions on signals conveyed by public patronage when government 
intervention in the market is lower. First, when the market is under greater 
government control, public patronage will be less effective in mitigating the 
information asymmetry. As illustrated above, third-party resource holders face 
uncertainty about a firm and thereby pay attention to signals generated by public 
patronage to garner information on the firm’s quality, government favor, and/or 
legitimacy. However, when the government intensifies intervention in market 
transactions, third-party resource holders such as creditors likely receive frequent 
and direct information from the government regarding the firms with which they 
transact. Under such circumstances, resource holders will face less information 
asymmetry and thus have less need to seek indirect information from signals 
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conveyed by public patronage, as these signals likely provide redundant 
information. In line with this argument, empirical evidence has shown that firms 
are more likely to benefit from interorganizational endorsements when third-party 
stakeholders face greater uncertainty about the firms (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; 
Higgins, Stephan, and Thursby, 2011; King et al., 2005).  
Second, under stronger government control, third-party resource holders will 
likely base their decisions more on political concerns as opposed to any economic 
rationale. Resource holders such as creditors might face political pressure to 
transact with a firm irrespective of their evaluation of the firm. As a result, the 
link between resource holders’ decisions and the information regarding the firms 
conveyed by signals is weakened. Consistent with this argument, Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) show that government-controlled banks allocate more loans to 
politically connected firms in Pakistan despite these firms’ higher default rates. 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) suggest that politically connected firms in 
Indonesia enjoy preferential financing through state-owned banks, even though 
these firms underperform their non-connected peers. Similarly, Faccio et al. (2006) 
suggest that banks under political pressure may have to enter into transactions 
with weak firms. As such, when third-party resource holders are under greater 
government control, political concerns likely dominate economic rationale in their 
resource allocation decisions. For instance, they might direct resources to a firm 




Based on these arguments, when allocation of resources in the market is 
subject to less government control, third-party resource holders such as creditors 
will receive less information directly from the government and will thus be more 
likely to attend to signals conveyed by public patronage to evaluate firms. Further, 
resource holders’ decisions will be more independent from political pressure and 
thus better reflect their evaluations of firms. Hence, I hypothesize,  
 
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of public patronage on firms’ access to  
external resources is greater when government control over allocation of  
resources in the market is weaker. 
 
In addition to external market conditions, certain organizational attributes 
that provide direct and objective information regarding firms can likewise affect 
the level of information asymmetry faced by third-party resource holders. As such, 
these organizational attributes likely affect the extent to which signals will 
influence third-party resource holders’ decisions. For instance, Baum and Oliver 
(1991) find greater benefits generated by interorganizational legitimation for 
small and young organizations than for large and old ones. Rao (1994) argues that 
external certification is more valuable for new startups than for subsidiaries of 
established organizations. Stuart et al. (1999) find that endorsements by 
prominent exchange partners have a greater impact on IPO success for firms that 
are young and/or lack pre-IPO funding records. Higgins and Gulati (2003) show 
that firms whose technologies are associated with higher levels of uncertainty in 
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the eyes of investors benefit more from their affiliation with prominent 
organizations.  
Following this line of research, the signaling value of public patronage in 
mitigating information asymmetry and facilitating firms’ access to external 
resources is likely contingent on firm attributes that provide similar information to 
third-party resource holders.  As illustrated earlier, public patronage serves to 
signal a firm’s quality, government favor, and/or legitimacy. One particular firm 
attribute that likely conveys similar yet more direct information on a firm’s 
government favor and legitimacy is state ownership. On the one hand, state 
ownership indicates a firm’s ability to obtain government-controlled resources 
and influence policy decisions. Prior research has found that firms’ equity ties 
with government weaken the benefits from other forms of political access such as 
personal ties. For instance, Peng and Luo (2000) show that managers’ political 
ties have less impact on market share and financial performance for state-owned 
firms than for non-state-owned firms. Li and Zhang (2007) find that managers’ 
political networking results in fewer performance gains for state-owned firms than 
for private firms. Jia (2014) finds that government ownership reduces managers’ 
propensity to engage in private political actions. Based on these arguments, third-
party resource holders likely perceive lower levels of uncertainty regarding a 
state-owned firm’s ability to obtain government-controlled resources and 
favorable policies, thus decreasing the value of signals in mitigating information 
asymmetry. On the other hand, state ownership may also serve as channels 
through which status and legitimacy spread from the government to firms. As 
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such, legitimation through public patronage will be less effective in enhancing 
third-party resource holders’ perceptions of a state-owned firm’s legitimacy and 
status.  
In sum, state ownership likely provides similar and more direct information 
regarding a firm’s government favor and legitimacy, thus rendering signals 
conveyed by public patronage redundant. Hence, I hypothesize,  
 
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of public patronage on firms’ access to  
external resources is weaker for state-owned firms than for non-state-owned  
firms. 
   
Similarly, a firm’s superior economic performance can likewise convey 
direct and objective information regarding the firm’s quality and legitimacy to 
third-party resource holders, which will likely weaken the signaling value of 
public patronage. Prior research suggests that the amount of financial resources a 
firm possesses influences its tendency to engage in political actions (Hillman et 
al., 2004). Firms with a larger stock of financial resources are more likely to 
pursue individual political actions than collective political actions (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999), and are more likely to combine different political tactics (Schuler et 
al., 2002). Based on these findings, firms with better economic performance 
might have more financial resources to afford political strategies such as public 
patronage. However, I argue that these firms will also likely benefit less from 
signals conveyed by public patronage than their peers with lower economic 
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performance. As a result, more profitable firms will likely have fewer incentives 
to seek public patronage despite their larger stocks of financial resources to afford 
it.  
Specifically, a firm’s superior economic performance likely conveys direct 
information on its quality and legitimacy to third-party resource holders, thereby 
making signals conveyed by public patronage redundant. On the one hand, third-
party resource holders such as creditors may associate a firm’s better economic 
performance with its superior quality, and thus perceive lower uncertainty in their 
transactions with the firm. In line with the argument, Cull and Xu (2005) find that 
despite the political influence over lending decisions in China’s credit markets, 
economic criteria still matter and better economic performance helps firms obtain 
larger bank loans. As such, a firm’s superior performance record should help 
redress third-party resource holders’ concerns about the risk and uncertainty 
associated with the firm, thus decreasing the value of signals conveyed by public 
patronage. On the other hand, third-party resource holders might also associate 
more profitable firms with higher legitimacy and status, and thus are less likely to 
rely on signals to infer such information. Consistent with this argument, prior 
research shows that interorganizational legitimation is less beneficial when 
organizational attributes such as size and age already convey an organization’s  
legitimacy and status to external stakeholders (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Stuart et 
al., 1999).  
In sum, a firm’s superior economic performance such as higher profitability 
likely provides unambiguous information on the firm’s quality and legitimacy, 
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decreasing the need for third-party resource holders to rely on signals to evaluate 
the firm. Thus, firms with higher profitability will benefit less from public 
patronage in accessing external resources. Hence, I hypothesize,  
 
Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of public patronage on firms’ access to  





China’s political system consists of five levels of government: the center, 
provinces, prefectures, counties, and townships. After the economic reform began 
in 1978, the former central planning system was dismantled and authority over the 
local economy such as resource allocation and investment approval was 
progressively delegated to subnational government (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). 
The central government directly supervises provincial governments which in turn 
supervise lower levels of governments. Consistent with prior research (Bo, 1998; 
Jia, 2014; Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Maskin, Qian, and 
Xu, 2000), this paper focuses on provincial-level administrations and examines 
public visits by provincial government officials. The focus on the provincial level 
also has the advantage of allowing me to use the information on the cross-
province variance in government control of credit markets, as will be further 
illustrated in the description of measurements.  
 70 
 
Chinese managers widely seek public patronage from government officials 
of various levels. Official visits have often been publicized by firms as a part of 
their public relation strategies. For example, it has been reported that a Chinese 
firm ―advertised‖ the visit of a high level government official on the electronic 
screens in trains (Liu, 2002). Firms that receive official visits also take the 
opportunities to take pictures of their managers with government officials and 
post the pictures in their offices. Official visits are used by firms to signal 
government endorsement and political capital to external stakeholders such as 
investors and creditors (Ma, 2006). As a result, these firms might enjoy privileges 
in obtaining resources such as financial credit. The practice has been so common 
that, in his anti-corruption campaign, Chinese president Xi Jinping explicitly 
restricted officials from attending ribbon-cutting ceremonies (Hook, 2012).    
 
Data and sample 
This study focuses on official visits to firms in China’s steel industry. The 
dataset is compiled from several sources. First, I use the China Steel Yearbook to 
obtain the list of steel firms operating in China and the records of government 
official visits to these firms. The Yearbook is published by the China Iron and 
Steel Association and lists the names of all major steel firms in China that are 
identified by industry experts and regulatory officials. According to the Steel 
Association, the firms covered by the Yearbook represent approximately 70 
percent of China’s crude steel production. In addition, I also obtained a list of 
steel firms that were acquired by the firms covered by the Yearbook list. In the 
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robustness tests, I conduct subsample analyses based on only the Yearbook firms 
to check the sensitivity of the results.   
The Yearbook keeps a unique diary of major events in the industry, which 
include public visits to firms by provincial government officials. In the Chinese 
context, official visits are regarded as privileges and honors for the industry and 
firms. As such, the Yearbook, which is published by the semi-official Steel 
Association, comprehensively documents the official visits to steel firms 
throughout the year. I read through the dairies and manually coded the visits by 
provincial government officials. During the process, I have also checked the 
officials’ rank through the description in the Yearbook and government Web sites. 
In cases where multiple officials joined a single visit, I coded the official with the 
highest rank among the group as an independent visit and coded other officials’ 
visits as accompanying visits. This is because lower-ranking officials in China are 
often obliged to accompany higher-ranking officials. As such, accompanying 
visits differ from independent visits and might not be regarded by third-party 
resource holders as officials’ efforts to endorse the firms.  
Next, I matched firm names with the Annual Industrial Survey Database 
1998–2009 compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) to 
retrieve firm profiles and financial information. The Survey Database covers 
firms of all types of ownership in China. By law, all firms were required to report 
to the survey if their annual sales exceeded five million RMB (or roughly 
US$760,000 based on the exchange rate in 2010). This database has been widely 
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used in prior research (e.g., Buckley, Clegg, and Wang, 2007; Chang and Xu, 
2008; Chang and Wu, 2013; Zhang et al., 2010).  
Finally, provincial-level data are obtained from China Data Online, a 
database from the University of Michigan. To assess the conditions of provincial 
resource markets, I use the marketization index constructed by the National 
Economic Research Institute (NERI). The NERI index of market development 
covers five dimensions including the development of resource markets and the 
development of market intermediaries and the legal environment. Under each 
category, sub-indexes measure specific areas of market institutions. The indexes 
are calculated for each of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions each year 
based on data from the NBSC as well as surveys on firms in China conducted by 
NERI. Prior research in economics and strategy has widely used the NERI index 
to measure the variance in market institutions across provinces and over time (e.g. 
Chang and Wu, 2013; Jia, 2014; Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006; Li et al., 2008).  
The matched sample consists of 156 firms during 1998–2009 and official 
visits to these firms during 1995–2008. The mean total assets and mean total sales 
of these firms are approximately US$ 1.6 billion and US$ 1.3 billion, respectively 
(based on the exchange rate in 2010).  
 
Measurement 
Dependent variable  
To test the effects of official visits on firms’ access to external resources, 
this study focuses on long-term financial credit accessed by firms. Firms’ access 
to external financial resources has been widely used in prior research to examine 
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the effects of political strategies (Bai et al., 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et 
al., 2008; Nee and Opper, 2010) and signaling (Certo, 2003; Higgins and Gulati, 
2006; Stuart et al., 1999). In the present empirical context, the measurement of 
long-term credit is ideal for testing the theoretical propositions for several reasons. 
First, long-term credit is a key resource in this capital-intensive industry, as steel 
firms rely on long-term credit to pursue expansion through acquisitions and 
investment in new plants. However, creditors often perceive a high risk involved 
in lending large amounts of long-term debt, making it a scarce resource for which 
steel firms must compete for (Zhang and Wang, 2013). Second, since creditors 
tend to associate higher risk with long- rather than short-term debt, they are more 
likely to act upon information on firms conveyed by signals when making lending 
decisions. Thus public patronage is more likely to have an impact on firms’ access 
to long- as opposed to short-term credit. Third, although local governments used 
to exert substantial influence over local credit markets through intervention, 
reforms in the financial sector in the 1990s centralized the banking system and 
shifted control over local bank branches from local governments to bank 
headquarters (Tao and Yang, 2008; Xu, 2011). Nevertheless, local governments 
still retain different degrees of formal and informal influence over creditors’ 
lending decisions in their jurisdictions. The actual level of government control 
over credit markets varies across regions and over time (Bai et al., 2006; Jia, 2014; 
Li et al., 2008). As such, this setting provides the advantage of allowing me to test 
how the signaling effects of public patronage vary with the level of government 
control over third-party resource holders.  
 74 
 
Specifically, access to long-term credit is measured as the logarithm of the 
firm’s total long-term debt. In the robustness tests, I also test the effects of public 
patronage on firms’ access to short-term credit and their tax payment as 
alternative dependent variables.  
 
Independent and moderator variables  
Chinese officials, including provincial officials, are graded on a rank system 
with 15 different levels. In this study, I focus on visits by provincial officials of 
four different levels: provincial, deputy provincial, bureau, and deputy bureau. I 
exclude official visits for general events such as industry conferences held in a 
particular firm. Firms in the industry along government officials are invited to 
attend those conferences. Therefore, such visits are not likely to be associated 
with any government endorsements or favor to the host firm, thus making them 
inherently different from targeted visits. Similarly, as explained earlier, I also 
exclude visits by officials who accompany higher-ranking officials since 
accompanying visits may not represent a voluntary offer of public endorsement. 
Moreover, firms and stakeholders tend to pay more attention to officials of the 
highest rank during a group visit. Official visit is coded as a dichotomous variable 
which is equal to one if a focal firm has received official visits in the previous 
three years and as zero otherwise. I choose the three-year time frame to account 
for the lasting signaling effects of official visits as well as the choice of dependent 
variable of firms’ long-term credit.  
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To measure the degree of government control over credit markets, I use 
NERI marketization indexes. Since China’s economy is in transition and 
characterized by substantial cross-regional variance in market and legal 
institutions, the NERI index is designed to capture the level of marketization in 
each province in each year. Prior research in strategy and economics has widely 
used the index to measure the varying degrees of government control over 
resource markets across provinces and over time (e.g. Chang and Wu, 2013; Jia, 
2014; Li et al., 2006). In particular, the first index I use is the market allocation of 
credit, which measures the extent to which financial resources are allocated based 
on market forces as opposed to government intervention (Fan, Wang, and Zhu, 
2011). As illustrated earlier, the actual level of control that provincial 
governments have over credit markets varies across provinces and over time. 
Local governments in China tend to use their influence over credit markets to 
direct financial resources to state-owned firms, which usually underperform their 
non-state-owned peers yet account for a considerable share of local jobs and fiscal 
revenue (Bai et al., 2006; Cull and Xu, 2005; Tao and Yang, 2008; Xu, 2011). As 
such, NERI calculates this index based on the percentage of bank loans allocated 
to the non-state-owned sector, such that easier access to financial credit for the 
non-state-owned sector indicates higher levels of independence of creditors from 
government intervention in their lending (Fan et al., 2011; Jia, 2014). Specifically, 
a higher value of the index corresponds to a lower level of government control 
over credit markets.  
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The second index I use is the development of market intermediaries, which 
measures the development of market intermediaries such as law and accounting 
firms. NERI calculates this measure based on its surveys of firms in China and 
then aggregates firm-level data to compose a provincial-level index. Better 
developed legal and accounting services should correspond to higher levels of 
transparency in the resource markets, which helps constrain government officials’ 
discretion to distort the market allocation process and pressure resource holders to 
favor specific firms. To facilitate the interpretation, I use the demeaned value for 
both indexes in the analyses.  
In addition, I also examine the moderating effects of firm attributes that can 
convey objective information to third-party resource holders. Specifically, I 
follow the legal definition by NBSC to define state-owned firms based on their 
registration in the government administration. State ownership is coded as one for 
firms that registered as state-owned firms and as zero otherwise. In addition, 
Profitability is calculated as the return on assets of the firm times 100.  
 
Control variables 
I control for a range of region- and firm-level variables that influence the 
amount of long-term credit accessed by firms. I code firm size as the logarithm of 
total assets, foreign ownership as a dummy that indicates whether the firm 
registered as a foreign firm, liquidity as the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities, central firm as a dummy to indicate whether the firm is directly 
regulated by the central administration, and provincial firm as a dummy to 
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indicate whether the firm is directly regulated by a provincial administration. 
Manager as Congress/Conference member is another dummy that captures 
whether the top manager of the parent company of the firm is a member in one of 
the two legislative bodies, the National People’s Congress (the Congress) and the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the Conference). Prior 
research suggests managerial service in the Congress or the Conference as a 
common political strategy for Chinese managers to build political ties (e.g. Jia, 
2014; Li et al., 2006; Li and Qian, 2013). Additionally, to capture potential group-
level resource sharing, I control for the number of group affiliates which measures 
the total number of firms affiliated to the same parent company as the focal firm. 
Provincial GDP is the logarithm of the province’s GDP, and provincial officials 
in Politburo is another dummy to indicate whether the chief administrators of the 
provincial government are members of the Politburo, which is the ultimate 
decision-making body of the Communist Party of China. Finally, I control for 
another two dimensions of the market institutions using two other NERI indexes: 
government spending relative to GDP, which measures the share of government 
spending in GDP (a higher value of this index indicates a lower share of 
government spending in GDP), and reduction on regulatory burden, which 
measures the ease of obtaining government approval and licenses for businesses.  
 
Analysis 
I estimate the models by running ordinary least squares regression with fixed 
effects for firms, which control for any unobserved, non-time-varying firm 
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characteristics unaccounted for by the control variables. I also include year fixed 
effects in the analyses to partial out the effects of any factors in a specific year 
that could affect the dependent variable across all firms. To handle potential serial 
correlations across observations in the same firm, all models are estimated using 
the robust estimator of variance clustered by firm. As explained earlier, in all the 
models, the independent variable measures official visits to the firm in the 
previous three years, helping to reduce the possibility of reverse causality.  
Despite including the control variables as well as firm and year fixed effects, 
the possibility that unobserved time-varying factors such as firms’ political ties 
may affect both the firm’s access to financial credit and official visits raises 
potential endogeneity concerns. To address these concerns, I follow prior research 
and conduct Heckman’s two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979; Shaver, 1998). In 
the first stage, I use random effects probit model to predict the likelihood that a 
firm has received official visits in the previous three years. Variables included in 
the first stage are firm size, foreign ownership, state ownership, profitability, 
central firm, provincial firm, government spending relative to GDP, reduction on 
regulatory burden, market allocation of credit, and provincial GDP, along with 
province and year dummies. To predict the likelihood that a firm has received 
official visits in the previous three years, ideally I should have the information on 
firm and province variables for the years before the visits. However, such 
information is lacking due to data limitations. Nevertheless, the variables included 
in the first stage should be highly correlated across years. Therefore, I use the 
value of the variables in a focal year as proxies of their values in the previous 
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years to predict the likelihood of firms’ receiving official visits during the three-
year period prior to the focal year.  
The excluded variable that is included in the first stage but not in the second 
stage is official visit to other firms in the province, which is coded as one if other 
firms in the same province where the focal firm is located have received official 
visits in the previous three years, and as zero otherwise. On the one hand, since 
officials have limited time, official visits to other firms should decrease the 
likelihood that a focal firm receives official visits. On the other hand, official 
visits to other firms in the province should not have a direct impact on the focal 
firm’s access to financial credit, since creditors are not likely to fix the total 
amount of lending to firms from one industry within one province. The results in 
Table 2 confirm the prediction and show that official visits to other firms in the 
same province indeed reduce the likelihood that a focal firm receives official 
visits during the same period. I then construct the inverse Mills ratio based on the 
first stage results and insert it to the second stage to control for the unobserved 
time-varying factors that can affect both firms’ access to financial credit and 




Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for variables in 
this study. Due to the high correlation between market allocation of credit and 
development of market intermediaries, I enter these two index variables separately 
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into the models. Table 2 presents the results of the first stage regression for the 
two-step procedures. Models 1 and 2 show that in addition to official visits to 
other firms in the same province, certain firm attributes also affect the likelihood 
that a firm receives official visits. Specifically, a firm is more likely to receive at 
least one provincial official visit during the three-year period if the firm is large, 
owned by the state, and/or regulated directly by the provincial government.  
    Table 3 presents the main results of the effects of public patronage on 
firms’ access to long-term credit. Specifically, Model 1 tests the main effect of 
official visits. Models 2–5 test the moderating effects. Finally, Models 6–7 are the 
full models.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that public patronage serves as signals on a firm’s 
quality, government favor, and/or legitimacy to third-party resource holders, thus 
enhancing the firm’s access to external resources. Model 1 shows that official 
visits have a positive and significant effect on the amount of long-term credit 
accessed by the firm. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 receives support. To interpret the 
coefficient, holding all else constant, a firm that received at least one provincial 
official visit in the previous three years had long-term debt that was 42.2 percent 
higher compared to a firm that did not receive any visit by provincial officials. 
This increase is significant for steel firms in China given the difficulty they face 
in borrowing long-term debt.  




Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Model 2 shows the positive and significant 
interaction between official visit and market allocation of credit, suggesting that 
the positive effect of official visits on firm’s access to long-term credit is greater 
when the provincial government has less control over allocation of financial 
resources in credit markets. Similarly, in Model 3, the interaction between official 
visit and development of market intermediaries is positive and significant, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 2. These findings indicate that official visits generate 
greater signaling benefits for firms in accessing long-term credit when better 
developed market intermediaries such as legal and accounting services provide 
higher transparency and thus put more constraints on officials’ discretion to 
intervene in credit markets.  
Model 4 shows the negative and significant interaction between official visit 
and state ownership. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 3, which predicts that 
the signaling value of public patronage in facilitating firms’ access to external 
resources is weaker for state-owned firms than for non-state-owned firms, since 
state ownership likely provides direct and objective information regarding 
government favor and legitimacy of the firms and thus renders signals redundant.  
In Model 5, the interaction between official visit and profitability is negative but 
not significant. As such, the results do not support Hypothesis 4, which predicts 
that public patronage generates fewer benefits for firms with better economic 
performance. 
Finally, Models 6 and 7 are the full models including all variables and 
interactions (for market allocation of credit and development of market 
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As illustrated earlier, one alternative explanation that can cause endogeneity 
concerns is that firms with unobserved political ties may access greater long-term 
credit as well as receive more official visits. If official visits simply reflect firms’ 
political ties, the positive effect of official visits on firms’ access to credit would 
merely capture the effects of political ties in helping firms obtain resources 
through direct government allocation as opposed to the signaling mechanism. 
However, I argue that the results are not likely to be driven by the alternative 
explanation. First, in the analyses, I control for a range of firm attributes including 
whether or not the parent company’s manager is a member in the Congress or the 
Conference, which is a typical measure of political ties in China (Jia, 2014; Li et 
al., 2006; Li and Qian, 2013). Further, the inverse mills ratio generated from the 
first stage of the Heckman’s procedure should account for unobserved political 
ties. Moreover, the results on the positive interactions between official visits and 
market index variables are inconsistent with the alternative explanation. 
Specifically, if the positive effect of official visits reflects the fact that politically 
connected firms access more financial resources through government allocation, 
then the positive effect is expected to weaken when the government has less 
control over allocation of financial resources, as documented by prior research 
(Nee and Opper, 2010). To the contrary, the positive interactions between official 
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visits and market index variables in the results suggest a greater impact of official 
visits in facilitating firms’ access to long-term credit when the government has 
less redistributive power in credit markets. Thus, these results favor the signaling 
mechanism over the alternative explanation.  
I conduct several robustness tests to confirm the results. First, I examine the 
relationship between the focal firm’s access to long-term credit and official visits 
to other firms that are affiliated with the same parent company as the focal firm 
and located in other provinces. Based on the signaling mechanism, public 
patronage received by other firms affiliated with the same group likely has a 
spillover effect on external resource holders’ perceptions of the focal firm’s 
quality and legitimacy. For example, prior research has shown that business group 
affiliates share intangible resources such as brands (Chang and Hong, 2000). In 
contrast, under the alternative explanation that political ties increase firms’ 
financial resources, a focal firm’s access to financial credit should not be affected 
by official visits to group affiliates in other provinces. This is because provincial 
governments in China compete with one another for economic growth and 
investments, making them sensitive to the transfer of financial resources across 
provinces (Xu, 2011). Such transfer is particularly unlikely if the resources are 
obtained with the assistance of provincial officials. Empirically, I use a 
dichotomous variable and a count variable to measure official visit to other group 
affiliates in other provinces in the previous three years.
2
 In Table 4, the results 
show that, official visits to other firms affiliated with the same parent company 
                                                          
2
 Accordingly, in Table 4, I use a dichotomous variable and a count variable to measure official 
visit in Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. 
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and located in other provinces have a positive and significant effect on the focal 
firm’s access to long-term credit. Therefore, these results lend further support to 
the signaling mechanism as opposed to the alternative explanation.      
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Second, I test the effects of public patronage on firms’ access to short-term 
credit as an alternative dependent variable. If the main results are driven by the 
signaling mechanism, the signaling value should vary with the level of uncertainty 
faced by third-party resource holders regarding their transactions with the firms 
(Higgins and Gulati, 2003). In the present setting, creditors tend to perceive lower 
risk involved in short- than long-term loans (Zhang and Wang, 2013). As such, 
signals conveyed by public patronage are less likely to influence firms’ access to 
short-term credit. However, if the results are driven by the alternative explanation, 
political ties should also help firms obtain more short-term credit through 
government redistribution, and thus officials visits should have a positive effect 
on firms’ access to short-term credit. Specifically, I define access to short-term 
credit as the logarithm of the total short-term debt accessed by the firm. In Table 
5, the results show that the coefficients of public patronage and the interactions 
are not significant, with the only exception of the interaction between official visit 
and profitability. Hence, these results are consistent with the predictions based on 
the signaling mechanism.   




Third, I use firms’ tax payment as another dependent variable. Prior research 
suggests that tax breaks are a major benefit generated by firms’ political strategies 
(Faccio, 2010; Li et al., 2008; Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2009). 
However, based on the signaling mechanism, signals conveyed by public 
patronage might in general have little impact on firms’ tax payment, as tax breaks 
are directly allocated by the government. Signals will likely reduce firms’ tax 
payment only when officials have less discretion to intervene in the allocation of 
tax breaks to favor firms. For instance, official visits might signal a firm’s quality, 
government favor, and/or legitimacy to the tax bureau staff when officials are 
constrained from directly intervening in the allocation procedure for tax breaks. In 
contrast, if official visits merely reflect political ties, official visits should have a 
negative effect on firms’ tax payment, since politically connected firms tend to 
obtain more tax breaks (Faccio, 2010). Further, the negative effect should be 
stronger when officials have more discretionary power to distribute tax breaks to 
favor firms. Empirically, I measure tax payment as the logarithm of the total 
amount of tax paid by the firm. Since tax payment is related to a firm’s sales 
revenue, I replace firm size with total sales which is measured by the logarithm of 
the firm’s sales revenue. In Table 6, Model 1 shows that the coefficient of official 
visit is not significant, suggesting official visits generally do not help firms obtain 
tax breaks. Models 2 and 4 show a negative interaction between official visits and 
the development of market intermediaries, indicating that official visits help firms 
obtain tax breaks when market and legal institutions provide higher transparency 
and put more constraints on officials’ discretion. Thus, these findings favor the 
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signaling mechanism over the alternative explanation. The negative and 
significant interaction between official visits and state ownership suggests that tax 
breaks are an exclusive resource to state-owned firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Fourth, I replace the dichotomous variable of official visit with a count 
variable. Based on my arguments, the strength of signals might also affect the 
perceptions and decisions of third-party resource holders. As such, the number of 
official visits to a firm likely reflects the level of government endorsement which 
in turn affects firms’ access to long-term credit. Specifically, the count variable is 
coded as the number of official visits to the firm in the previous three years. In 
particular, this variable captures both the number of visits made by government 
officials, as well as the number of officials of the same rank during a group visit. I 
similarly exclude accompanying visits and visits due to attendance to conferences 
as in the main analyses. The results in Table 7 are similar to those reported in 
Table 2. In particular, the interaction between the number of official visits and 
firms’ profitability is negative and significant. This concurs with Hypothesis 4, 
which predicts that better economic performance of a firm conveys information 
on the firm’s quality and legitimacy, thereby rendering public patronage 
redundant and ineffective.  




Fifth, I conduct separate tests for official visits based on whether the official 
is from the provincial government (the executive branch) or the provincial 
Congress and Conference (the legislative branch). In the Chinese context, the 
legislative branch plays a less important role than the executive branch and does 
not regulate firms or allocates resources. As such, signals conveyed by visits by 
legislative officials are less likely to affect third-party resource holders’ 
perceptions regarding a firm’s quality, access to government-controlled resources, 
and/or legitimacy. Results in Table 8 confirm these arguments, suggesting that the 
signaling value of public patronage is generated by visits by officials from the 
executive branch rather than the legislative branch.
3
  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, one may be concerned about the inclusion of target firms that were 
acquired by firms from the Yearbook into the sample, since these firms may 
possess different characteristics that can affect their access to long-term credit. To 
address this concern, I drop the target firms and analyze the subsample including 
only the firms from the Yearbook. Since the Yearbook firms are all identified by 
regulatory officials and industry experts as major steel firms in China, they likely 
share similar observable and unobservable characteristics. The number of firms 
decreases to 117 and the sample size drops to 1248. In Table 9, the results show 
similar patterns to those in Table 3, although the significance level is lower likely 
due to the reduced explanatory power of the smaller sample.  
                                                          
3
 Since the sample includes only provincial and deputy provincial level officials from the 
legislative branch, I drop visits by executive officials below the deputy provincial level to make 
the results comparable.  
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[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on the signaling value of political strategies by 
examining the effects of public patronage in the form of public visits to firms by 
government officials on firms’ access to external resources. Drawing upon 
signaling theory and research on interorganizational endorsements, this paper 
suggests that public patronage serves to signal a firm’s quality, government favor, 
and/or legitimacy, which could mitigate third-party resource holders’ uncertainty 
about the firm and thereby enhance the firm’s access to external resources. Based 
on a unique dataset that comprehensively covers official visits to firms in China’s 
steel industry during 1995–2009, the results show that public patronage increases 
firms’ access to long-term credit, a key resource in this capital-intensive industry. 
More importantly, the results provide evidence that the signaling benefits from 
public patronage in facilitating firms’ access to external resources are greater 
when the government has less control over allocation of resources in the market. 
Finally, public patronage is found to be less effective when other firm attributes 
such as state ownership provide third-party resource holders with direct and 
objective information regarding the firm, rendering signals conveyed by public 







This study advances the research on political strategies, which has focused 
on benefits derived from firms’ political strategies through direct mechanisms 
(Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Macher and Mayo, 2012). For 
instance, prior research has suggested that firms employ political strategies such 
as lobbing and political contribution to obtain favorable legislation and 
government-controlled resources such as government contracts. In this paper, I 
use a unique dataset on official visits to firms to test an alternative, indirect 
mechanism through which political strategies benefit firms by serving as signals 
to third-party resource holders which in turn facilitate firms’ access to external 
resources. As such, the findings on the signaling value generated by public 
patronage through influencing the perceptions and decisions of third-party 
resource holders complement and extend the existing literature that has 
considered political strategies as vehicles of direct exchange for resources 
between firms and political actors (Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman and Keim, 1995).    
Moreover, this paper complements and contrasts with prior research that has 
considered how the value of political strategies depends on the level of 
government control over markets (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005; Jia, 
2014; Nee and Opper, 2010). This body of research suggests that firms’ political 
strategies generate fewer or no benefits when allocation of resources is based on 
market competition vis-à-vis government intervention. The findings from this 
paper show that, while decreased government intervention in markets may reduce 
the benefits generated by political strategies through direct mechanisms, it 
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increases the signaling value of political strategies generated through the indirect 
mechanism. Third-party resource holders are more likely to attend to and rely on 
signals conveyed by public patronage when their resource allocation decisions are 
more independent from government control. As such, the findings on the indirect 
signaling mechanism supplement prior research and contribute to a more 
complete understanding of how the effects of political strategies vary with 
external market conditions.  
Finally, this paper also contributes to the body of research on 
interorganizational endorsements (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Podolny, 1993; Rao, 
1994; Stuart et al., 1999). Previous studies suggest that firms’ relationships with 
prominent organizations serve to signal and certify the firms’ quality and 
legitimacy and thereby help firms attract resources from external stakeholders 
(Higgins and Gulati, 2006; Ozmel, Reuer, and Gulati, 2013). This paper builds 
upon and extends this literature by suggesting public patronage as an alternative 
form of interorganizational endorsement whose value in facilitating firms’ access 
to external resources hinges on the level of endorser control over third-party 
resource holders. Specifically, the findings from this study show that the benefits 
from such endorsements are greater when the endorsers have less control over 
third-party resource holders. 
 
Managerial implications 
This study offers important practical implications for managers formulating 
political strategies. The findings suggest that in addition to serving as vehicles for 
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direct resource exchange between firms and politicians, political strategies can 
also benefit firms through generating signals that influence the perceptions and 
decisions of the firms’ external stakeholders. For example, official visits to firms 
are often made visible to the public through coverage of national and local media. 
Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that firms often have certain degrees of 
influence over officials’ choice of firms to visit. Firms can also choose the extent 
to which they showcase those official visits to external stakeholders such as 
investors and regulators. In many cases, politically connected firms have been 
found to keep a low profile and conceal their political ties. In contrast, this study 
highlights the situations where ―bragging‖ about political capital is beneficial for 
firms. For example, firms in China often invite officials to attend their ribbon-
cutting ceremonies and then ―advertise‖ the visits to their external stakeholders.  
The findings from this paper also offer new insights for firms pursuing 
political strategies in markets where government intervention is low. Previous 
studies suggest that the gains from corporate political investments will decline as 
the market is deregulated and thus more independent from government 
intervention. This paper suggests that managers projecting the benefits and costs 
of political investments should take into consideration the combined benefits 
generated through both the direct and indirect mechanisms, particularly because 
the direct and indirect value-generating mechanisms for political strategies move 
in opposite directions when government control over markets weakens. 
Specifically, the findings from this study show that the signaling value of political 
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strategies generated through the indirect mechanism will strengthen when there is 
less government intervention in the market.  
 
Limitations and future directions 
There are opportunities to further the line of inquiry in this study. First, 
while this paper suggests that public patronage in the form of official visits 
benefits firms through a different mechanism compared to private patronage that 
serves as vehicles of direct resource exchange between firms and politicians, I 
examine only public patronage due to data limitations. Although the findings 
support my propositions, it would be ideal to directly compare the effects of 
public patronage with those of private patronage. One major difficulty is the lack 
of comprehensive information on private patronage, such as informal ties between 
managers and politicians (Jia, 2014; Xin and Pearce, 1996). However, some 
previous studies have relied on sources such as media reports to document such 
information (e.g. Faccio, 2006; Zhu and Chung, forthcoming). Future research 
may employ a similar approach to compare the direct and indirect mechanisms 
through which political strategies impact firm outcomes. Based on findings from 
this paper and prior research, constraints on government intervention are expected 
to decrease the benefits from private patronage while increasing those from public 
patronage.  
Future research may also compare the effects of public patronage with 
different degrees of visibility. For example, official visits may be covered by 
either national or local media. Additionally, they can be reported on the first page 
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or the last page of a newspaper. Firms may also highlight those visits to different 
extents. Such detailed data would allow for a more fine-grained analysis on the 
relationship between the degree of visibility of public patronage and its effect on 
firm access to external resources.  
Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the effects of public patronage 
on other firm outcomes. In this study, I focus on firms’ access to external 
financial credit, which is a key resource in this capital-intensive industry, and 
examine how the effects of public patronage vary with the level of government 
intervention in credit markets. Future research can fruitfully examine the impact 
of public patronage related to other stakeholders of firms such as customers and 





Table 2.1. Summary statistics and correlations 
 
Variables  Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1.    Access to long-term credit 11.07 4.67 1.00                
2.    Official visit 0.32 0.47 0.38 1.00               
3.    Firm size 14.92 1.71 0.63 0.53 1.00              
4.    Foreign ownership  0.03 0.18 0.01 -0.08 0.03 1.00             
5.    State ownership 0.40 0.49 0.27 0.21 0.21 -0.15 1.00            
6.    Profitability 5.12 8.56 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.14 -0.22 1.00           
7.    Liquidity 3.00 77.40 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 1.00          
8.    Central firm 0.04 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.28 -0.04 0.14 -0.04 -0.01 1.00         
9.    Provincial firm 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.32 0.27 -0.14 0.47 -0.17 -0.02 -0.17 1.00        
10.  Manager as Congress/Conference member 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.12 0.03 1.00       
11.  Number of group affiliates 1.57 1.12 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.16 0.04 0.31 1.00      
12.  Government spending relative to GDP 0.00 2.29 -0.06 -0.15 -0.09 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.25 -0.02 -0.11 1.00     
13.  Reduction on regulatory burden 0.00 2.42 -0.01 0.04 0.13 0.07 -0.15 0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.20 0.07 0.08 0.25 1.00    
14.  Market allocation of credit 0.00 3.69 -0.04 0.02 0.19 0.15 -0.35 0.21 0.03 -0.01 -0.22 0.13 0.28 0.02 0.40 1.00   
15.  Development of market intermediaries 0.00 2.48 -0.03 0.08 0.27 0.11 -0.26 0.16 0.04 0.06 -0.14 0.15 0.25 -0.10 0.47 0.65 1.00  
16.  Provincial GDP 8.72 0.86 -0.05 0.04 0.19 0.15 -0.32 0.22 0.04 0.04 -0.39 0.11 0.22 0.45 0.50 0.69 0.56 1.00 
17.  Provincial officials in Politburo 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.13 0.04 1.00 
 
N = 1541. 
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Table 2.2. First-stage model for two-step estimation procedures 
 
  (1) (2) 





Firm size 0.715*** 0.702*** 
 
(0.078) (0.077) 
Foreign ownership  -0.098 -0.077 
 
(0.440) (0.432) 
State ownership 0.380* 0.380* 
 
(0.181) (0.180) 
Profitability 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Central firm 0.423 0.440 
 
(0.445) (0.431) 
Provincial firm 0.535* 0.534* 
 
(0.243) (0.239) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.108 -0.163* 
 
(0.076) (0.080) 
Reduction on regulatory burden 0.055 0.064+ 
 
(0.037) (0.037) 
Market allocation of credit -0.051 -0.066+ 
 
(0.038) (0.039) 
Provincial GDP -0.769 -0.612 
 
(1.090) (1.087) 
Constant -5.096 -6.346 
 
(10.318) (10.285) 
Province fixed effects YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Observations 1,541 1,541 
Number of firms 156 156 
Log likelihood -454.81 -449.25 
Wald chi-squared 289.55*** 293.75*** 
 
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable of official visit.  



















Table 2.3. Effect of official visit on long-term credit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Official visit  0.422+ 0.514* 0.437+ 0.915** 0.611+ 1.137** 1.156** 
 (0.244) (0.246) (0.248) (0.329) (0.337) (0.427) (0.431) 
Official visit X market allocation of credit  0.189***    0.173**  
 (0.053)    (0.055)  
Official visit X development of market 
intermediaries 
  0.223**    0.203** 
  (0.070)    (0.070) 
Official visit X state ownership    -1.032**  -0.789* -0.982* 
   (0.365)  (0.397) (0.383) 
Official visit X profitability     -0.043 -0.058 -0.057 
    (0.050) (0.045) (0.046) 
Firm size 2.251*** 2.207*** 2.287*** 2.286*** 2.238*** 2.219*** 2.296*** 
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.341) (0.329) (0.323) (0.319) (0.329) 
Foreign ownership  -0.780 -0.599 -0.687 -0.723 -0.804 -0.604 -0.667 
 (0.560) (0.538) (0.535) (0.524) (0.567) (0.522) (0.513) 
State ownership 0.426 0.418 0.421 0.903* 0.412 0.764+ 0.854* 
 (0.317) (0.319) (0.317) (0.384) (0.316) (0.394) (0.388) 
Profitability 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.012 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm 1.436* 1.526* 1.448* 1.549* 1.408* 1.568* 1.511* 
 (0.682) (0.644) (0.676) (0.634) (0.678) (0.604) (0.626) 
Provincial firm -0.045 0.035 -0.030 -0.021 -0.053 0.037 -0.019 
 (0.673) (0.660) (0.650) (0.653) (0.680) (0.656) (0.643) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member 0.093 0.097 0.076 0.095 0.073 0.072 0.053 
 (0.297) (0.297) (0.299) (0.297) (0.297) (0.297) (0.299) 
Number of group affiliates -0.182 -0.222+ -0.200 -0.186 -0.191 -0.233+ -0.213+ 




Table 2.3. (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.123 -0.104 -0.131 -0.121 -0.129 -0.112 -0.138 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.095) (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) (0.094) 
Reduction on regulatory burden -0.071 -0.108+ -0.092 -0.072 -0.069 -0.102 -0.086 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) 
Market allocation of credit 0.053 0.005  0.046 0.051 0.000  
 (0.066) (0.067)  (0.065) (0.066) (0.067)  
Development of market intermediaries   -0.053    -0.058 
   (0.126)    (0.124) 
Provincial GDP -1.268 -1.356 -1.438 -1.340 -1.190 -1.298 -1.361 
 (1.566) (1.505) (1.555) (1.515) (1.570) (1.476) (1.514) 
Provincial officials in Politburo -0.193 -0.097 -0.196 -0.170 -0.214 -0.115 -0.201 
 (0.586) (0.560) (0.574) (0.575) (0.588) (0.555) (0.566) 
Lambda (ƛ) 0.676+ 0.575 0.690+ 0.721* 0.681+ 0.624+ 0.731* 
 (0.361) (0.365) (0.368) (0.356) (0.357) (0.356) (0.359) 
Constant -12.738 -11.030 -11.460 -12.780 -13.291 -11.956 -12.553 
 (14.746) (14.165) (14.714) (14.265) (14.809) (13.903) (14.314) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
R-squared 0.205 0.213 0.210 0.209 0.207 0.217 0.215 
Number of firms 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of long-term credit. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.  







Table 2.4. Effect of official visit to other group affiliates in other 
provinces on long-term credit 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Dichotomous variable Count variable 




Official visit  0.444+ 0.081+ 
 (0.236) (0.045) 
Firm size 2.289*** 2.288*** 
 (0.327) (0.341) 
Foreign ownership  -0.741 -0.729 
 (0.563) (0.579) 
State ownership 0.430 0.465 
 (0.310) (0.310) 
Profitability 0.004 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm 1.479* 1.410* 
 (0.631) (0.679) 
Provincial firm -0.063 -0.146 
 (0.671) (0.675) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member -0.083 -0.030 
 (0.293) (0.301) 
Number of group affiliates -0.331* -0.323* 
 (0.135) (0.137) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.144 -0.151 
 (0.090) (0.092) 
Reduction on regulatory burden -0.064 -0.059 
 (0.061) (0.062) 
Market allocation of credit 0.040 0.043 
 (0.064) (0.065) 
Provincial GDP -1.202 -1.223 
 (1.516) (1.519) 
Provincial officials in Politburo -0.138 -0.133 
 (0.570) (0.569) 
Lambda (ƛ) 0.699+ 0.664+ 
 (0.354) (0.381) 
Constant -13.766 -13.447 
 (14.369) (14.274) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Observations 1,541 1,541 
Number of firms 156 156 
R-squared 0.211 0.210 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of long-term credit. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firm in parentheses.  





Table 2.5. Effect of official visit on short-term credit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Official visit  0.018 0.017 0.023 -0.004 -0.017 -0.050 -0.051 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.043) (0.037) (0.048) (0.048) 
Official visit X market allocation of credit  -0.001    -0.000  
 (0.007)    (0.007)  
Official visit X development of market 
intermediaries 
  0.007    0.008 
  (0.009)    (0.009) 
Official visit X state ownership    0.046  0.063 0.077 
   (0.054)  (0.056) (0.056) 
Official visit X profitability     0.008+ 0.009* 0.009* 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm size 1.100*** 1.101*** 1.088*** 1.099*** 1.103*** 1.101*** 1.089*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) 
Foreign ownership  -0.178* -0.179* -0.169* -0.180** -0.173* -0.177* -0.169* 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) 
State ownership 0.021 0.021 0.019 -0.001 0.023 -0.006 -0.014 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.066) (0.051) (0.066) (0.066) 
Profitability -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Liquidity -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm -0.192 -0.192 -0.194 -0.197 -0.186 -0.193 -0.196 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.129) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.127) 
Provincial firm -0.032 -0.033 -0.036 -0.033 -0.031 -0.032 -0.036 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member -0.066+ -0.066+ -0.064+ -0.066+ -0.062 -0.062 -0.060 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Number of group affiliates -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 




Table 2.5. (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Reduction on regulatory burden 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Market allocation of credit -0.011+ -0.011+  -0.011+ -0.011+ -0.010+  
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Development of market intermediaries   -0.000    0.000 
   (0.017)    (0.017) 
Provincial GDP 0.192 0.192 0.217 0.195 0.177 0.181 0.204 
 (0.175) (0.175) (0.170) (0.174) (0.175) (0.173) (0.169) 
Provincial officials in Politburo -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.060 -0.055 -0.056 -0.055 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Lambda (ƛ) 0.053 0.054 0.034 0.051 0.053 0.050 0.031 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.051) 
Constant -4.043* -4.053* -4.122* -4.041* -3.940* -3.934* -3.985* 
 (1.735) (1.731) (1.740) (1.736) (1.713) (1.713) (1.716) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
R-squared 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 
Number of firms 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of short-term credit. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
 
 




Table 2.6. Effect of official visit on tax payment 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Official visit  -0.076 -0.080 0.042 0.054 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.091) (0.093) 














Total sales 0.833*** 0.833*** 0.835*** 0.835*** 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) 
Foreign ownership  0.088 0.073 0.104 0.087 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.175) (0.172) 
State ownership 0.104 0.106 0.216* 0.234* 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.104) (0.107) 
Profitability 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Liquidity -0.000+ -0.000+ -0.000+ -0.000+ 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm 0.471** 0.473** 0.497*** 0.504*** 
 (0.152) (0.156) (0.138) (0.142) 
Provincial firm 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.052 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.103) (0.102) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member -0.014 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Number of group affiliates -0.044 -0.042 -0.044 -0.042 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Government spending relative to GDP 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.034 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
Reduction on regulatory burden -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Development of market intermediaries 0.015 0.024 0.012 0.024 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
Provincial GDP 0.290 0.293 0.283 0.285 
 (0.505) (0.504) (0.494) (0.492) 
Provincial officials in Politburo 0.242+ 0.241+ 0.247+ 0.247+ 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.138) (0.138) 
Lambda (ƛ) -0.285** -0.278** -0.282** -0.273** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Constant -3.082 -3.126 -3.078 -3.133 
 (5.427) (5.417) (5.333) (5.306) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,537 1,537 1,537 1,537 
R-squared 0.751 0.751 0.752 0.752 
Number of firms 156 156 156 156 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of tax payment. Robust standard errors clustered by firm 
in parentheses.  





Table 2.7. Effect of official visit on long-term credit (count of official visit) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Official visit  0.076 0.055 0.055 0.186** 0.138** 0.200** 0.198** 
 (0.047) (0.040) (0.043) (0.061) (0.042) (0.065) (0.064) 
Official visit X market allocation of credit  0.033**    0.031**  
 (0.011)    (0.011)  
Official visit X development of market 
intermediaries 
  0.024+    0.029** 
  (0.013)    (0.011) 
Official visit X state ownership    -0.183**  -0.151* -0.142* 
   (0.069)  (0.061) (0.057) 
Official visit X profitability     -0.015** -0.012* -0.014** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm size 2.245*** 2.252*** 2.302*** 2.258*** 2.170*** 2.201*** 2.243*** 
 (0.342) (0.334) (0.353) (0.340) (0.325) (0.322) (0.337) 
Foreign ownership  -0.769 -0.690 -0.769 -0.741 -0.776 -0.678 -0.746 
 (0.571) (0.569) (0.570) (0.552) (0.564) (0.549) (0.548) 
State ownership 0.442 0.433 0.439 0.711+ 0.488 0.693+ 0.688+ 
 (0.320) (0.324) (0.323) (0.360) (0.321) (0.355) (0.357) 
Profitability 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm 1.395* 1.356* 1.398* 1.478* 1.334+ 1.377* 1.399* 
 (0.693) (0.680) (0.700) (0.670) (0.688) (0.657) (0.677) 
Provincial firm -0.091 -0.057 -0.083 -0.111 -0.132 -0.109 -0.139 
 (0.679) (0.667) (0.665) (0.663) (0.679) (0.655) (0.651) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member 0.081 0.077 0.078 0.085 0.053 0.057 0.056 
 (0.295) (0.293) (0.296) (0.294) (0.295) (0.293) (0.295) 
Number of group affiliates -0.182 -0.207 -0.192 -0.183 -0.193 -0.215+ -0.204 




Table 2.7. (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.129 -0.110 -0.139 -0.129 -0.121 -0.105 -0.134 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.097) (0.095) (0.090) (0.092) (0.096) 
Reduction on regulatory burden -0.073 -0.092 -0.084 -0.075 -0.075 -0.095 -0.091 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.065) 
Market allocation of credit 0.056 0.017  0.055 0.057 0.021  
 (0.067) (0.068)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)  
Development of market intermediaries   -0.001    -0.007 
   (0.124)    (0.123) 
Provincial GDP -1.256 -1.425 -1.430 -1.327 -1.207 -1.430 -1.441 
 (1.567) (1.551) (1.583) (1.557) (1.564) (1.540) (1.575) 
Provincial officials in Politburo -0.143 -0.144 -0.146 -0.182 -0.165 -0.193 -0.195 
 (0.583) (0.574) (0.576) (0.578) (0.579) (0.567) (0.567) 
Lambda (ƛ) 0.648+ 0.659+ 0.726+ 0.671+ 0.598 0.636+ 0.696+ 
 (0.383) (0.369) (0.389) (0.383) (0.367) (0.359) (0.374) 
Constant -12.654 -11.095 -11.776 -12.306 -11.938 -10.340 -10.827 
 (14.746) (14.601) (14.981) (14.656) (14.675) (14.506) (14.841) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
R-squared 0.205 0.209 0.205 0.207 0.211 0.216 0.214 
Number of firms 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of long-term credit. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.  







Table 2.8. Effect of visit by officials from the executive and legislative branches on long-term credit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Executive Executive Executive Legislative Legislative Legislative 
Official visit 0.406+ 1.122** 1.135** 0.422 1.080 1.008 
 (0.243) (0.423) (0.426) (0.325) (0.699) (0.680) 










 Official visit X development of market 


























Firm size 2.254*** 2.224*** 2.302*** 2.303*** 2.300*** 2.341*** 
 (0.332) (0.320) (0.329) (0.339) (0.338) (0.347) 
Foreign ownership  -0.776 -0.611 -0.680 -0.817 -0.808 -0.829 
 (0.561) (0.524) (0.516) (0.569) (0.568) (0.572) 
State ownership 0.424 0.740+ 0.830* 0.489 0.526 0.541+ 
 (0.317) (0.387) (0.382) (0.325) (0.326) (0.324) 
Profitability 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm 1.436* 1.568* 1.513* 1.469* 1.416* 1.452* 
 (0.683) (0.606) (0.627) (0.674) (0.691) (0.690) 
Provincial firm -0.048 0.036 -0.017 -0.046 -0.040 -0.038 
 (0.674) (0.658) (0.645) (0.677) (0.667) (0.663) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member 0.086 0.076 0.056 0.090 0.101 0.093 




Table 2.8. (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Executive Executive Executive Legislative Legislative Legislative 
Number of group affiliates -0.182 -0.238+ -0.218+ -0.173 -0.172 -0.172 
 (0.128) (0.126) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.126 -0.119 -0.142 -0.135 -0.135 -0.142 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.099) 
Reduction on regulatory burden -0.072 -0.102 -0.086 -0.069 -0.070 -0.069 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) 
Market allocation of credit 0.053 -0.000 
 
0.048 0.037 
  (0.066) (0.067) 
 
(0.066) (0.067) 










Provincial GDP -1.276 -1.294 -1.355 -1.349 -1.357 -1.438 
 (1.567) (1.480) (1.518) (1.573) (1.583) (1.590) 
Provincial officials in Politburo -0.188 -0.113 -0.194 -0.165 -0.194 -0.203 
 (0.587) (0.558) (0.569) (0.594) (0.584) (0.582) 
Lambda (ƛ) 0.678+ 0.632+ 0.740* 0.751* 0.751* 0.812* 
 (0.363) (0.358) (0.360) (0.368) (0.367) (0.373) 
Constant -12.705 -12.081 -12.705 -12.814 -12.672 -12.439 
 (14.745) (13.934) (14.348) (14.782) (14.915) (15.066) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
R-squared 0.205 0.217 0.215 0.204 0.206 0.205 
Number of firms 156 156 156 156 156 156 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of long-term credit. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.  





Table 2.9. Effect of official visit on long-term credit (subsample with only Yearbook firms) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Official visit  0.265 0.326 0.280 0.601* 0.505 0.882* 0.901* 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.239) (0.274) (0.334) (0.392) (0.393) 
Official visit X market allocation of credit  0.132**    0.122*  
 (0.049)    (0.052)  
Official visit X development of market 
intermediaries 
  0.161*    0.147* 
  (0.069)    (0.069) 
Official visit X state ownership    -0.701*  -0.568 -0.707* 
   (0.308)  (0.349) (0.330) 
Official visit X profitability     -0.054 -0.065 -0.064 
    (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) 
Firm size 2.580*** 2.537*** 2.595*** 2.600*** 2.563*** 2.537*** 2.592*** 
 (0.336) (0.335) (0.337) (0.337) (0.321) (0.319) (0.321) 
Foreign ownership  -0.606 -0.475 -0.477 -0.527 -0.632 -0.452 -0.430 
 (0.749) (0.730) (0.717) (0.693) (0.751) (0.688) (0.664) 
State ownership 0.355 0.332 0.329 0.695* 0.346 0.599+ 0.663+ 
 (0.289) (0.289) (0.286) (0.340) (0.285) (0.349) (0.341) 
Profitability -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.009 0.012 0.012 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Central firm 1.148+ 1.241+ 1.118+ 1.228+ 1.103 1.245* 1.138+ 
 (0.673) (0.646) (0.661) (0.634) (0.670) (0.612) (0.619) 
Provincial firm -0.520 -0.469 -0.508 -0.499 -0.538 -0.477 -0.509 
 (0.629) (0.618) (0.616) (0.613) (0.638) (0.618) (0.613) 
Manager as Congress/Conference member 0.300 0.302 0.283 0.295 0.278 0.271 0.252 
 (0.268) (0.270) (0.270) (0.269) (0.267) (0.271) (0.270) 
Number of group affiliates -0.088 -0.119 -0.095 -0.093 -0.103 -0.139 -0.116 
 (0.123) (0.121) (0.122) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) 
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Table 2.9. (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Government spending relative to GDP -0.116 -0.097 -0.135+ -0.114 -0.123 -0.106 -0.142+ 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) 
Reduction on regulatory burden 0.026 -0.002 0.015 0.025 0.030 0.005 0.022 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Market allocation of credit 0.021 -0.018  0.015 0.018 -0.022  
 (0.059) (0.058)  (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)  
Development of market intermediaries   -0.108    -0.111 
   (0.113)    (0.111) 
Provincial GDP -0.445 -0.573 -0.454 -0.506 -0.326 -0.471 -0.342 
 (1.386) (1.347) (1.410) (1.347) (1.382) (1.316) (1.367) 
Provincial officials in Politburo 0.446 0.479 0.427 0.458 0.426 0.462 0.420 
 (0.452) (0.443) (0.446) (0.449) (0.454) (0.441) (0.444) 
Lambda (ƛ) 1.012** 0.923** 0.989** 1.035** 1.014** 0.951** 1.009** 
 (0.316) (0.321) (0.315) (0.317) (0.305) (0.309) (0.304) 
Constant -26.026* -23.985+ -25.951+ -25.881* -26.914* -25.079* -27.138* 
 (13.063) (12.541) (13.174) (12.656) (13.025) (12.174) (12.692) 
Firm fixed effects -0.651 -0.689 -0.704 -0.689 -0.584 -0.638 -0.626 
Year fixed effects (0.649) (0.637) (0.629) (0.642) (0.648) (0.631) (0.621) 
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 
R-squared 0.249 0.254 0.253 0.251 0.252 0.260 0.259 
Number of firms 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of long-term credit. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.  
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